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The Impact of Recent Court
Decisions Concerning Water
and Interstate Commerce on
Water Resources of the State
of New Mexicot
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS

The legislature in Laws 1983, Chapter 98, created the "water law study
committee" composed of five members appointed by the governor. The
committee was charged with the obligation to "study, examine and evaluate the impact and implications for the water resources available to the
state of recent court decisions concerning water and interstate commerce."
The legislation stated further that the committee "shall report to the
governor and the legislative council on or before January 1, 1984, which
report shall include recommendations concerning any modifications or
amendments to New Mexico water laws." This section contains an executive summary and the committee recommendations mandated by statute. The remainder is the text of the report.
A. Executive Summary
New Mexico is a state which has followed a system of prior appro'A Report to Governor Toney Anaya and the Legislative Council Pursuant to Laws, 1983, Chapter
98, prepared by the Water Law Study Committee: Charles T. DuMars, Chairman; Gov. Jack Campbell;
Robert B. Anderson; Les Davis; and Christina G. Chavez.
The Water Law Study Committee was created pursuant to an act of the 1983 Legislature, Laws
1983, Chapter 98. Its purpose, as stated in the language of the statute, was to "study, examine and
evaluate the impact and implications for water resources available to the State of recent court decisions
concerning water and interstate commerce."
This report represents the completion of this charge and is submitted to Governor Toney Anaya
and the Legislative Council in accordance with the instructions contained within the statute. Section
I of the report is reproduced as the "Executive Summary and Recommendations" of the Committee.
The members of the Committee would like to extend particular thanks to Attorney General Paul
Bardacke and State Engineer Steve Reynolds for their extensive personal assistance to the Committee
as well as the full cooperation of their respective staffs. A considerable debt is also owed to Ron
Cummings, Scott Taylor, Arthur Mehr, John Shomaker, and Lee Brown who gathered data and
performed extensive legal, economic, and hydrologic analysis extending substantially beyond what
was finally included in this report. The original drafts of most of the material in this report, in
addition to other material not included, was produced by them before subsequent modification and
editing by the Committee. Finally let us express our thanks to Kate Watson and her secretarial staff
at the Institute of Public Law for their patient typing and retying of this report.
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priation water law since before statehood. Under this system the first
person to divert water for beneficial use obtains a property right in the
water diverted. This water law has been further refined to promote maximum beneficial use of water resources by allowing transfers of these
rights by sale to others for beneficial use. The New Mexico "public," in
effect, has been considered the owner of the water resource in trust for
the citizens who could obtain a property right to use it so long as it was
not wasted or abandoned. If the right is wasted or abandoned, it will be
forfeited and made available to another member of the New Mexico
public.
Because the New Mexico public was considered trustee and sole owner
of the resource, only New Mexicans could use the resource. This doctrine
was reflected in a statute which prohibited transportation of groundwater
for use out-of-state. This concept of exclusive state use of water resources
was acknowledged by Congress in legislation which unilaterally approved
the division of surface waters between states and by congressional approval of interstate compacts which gave exclusive use of surface water
to each of the signatory states. The groundwater of a state, however, has
rarely been before Congress either as a part of a specific act of Congress
authorizing its exclusive use within a state or as part of an interstate
compact, except where the groundwater is interrelated with surface water.
Based on an early Supreme Court case, however, many legal scholars
had concluded that a state's groundwater could be limited to use exclusively within the state.
In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court faced the
question of whether the federal (commerce clause) interest in the free
flow of goods between states invalidated state statutes like Nebraska's
which prohibited the interstate transportation of groundwater unless the
receiving state permitted exportation.
The Supreme Court struck down the reciprocity clause of the Nebraska
groundwater transportation statute and extended the commerce clause
principles to groundwater transfers treating water like a "good" sold in
interstate commerce. In doing so, however, the Court showed its concern
that water in the arid West is different-arid states need to conserve water
for the future. It indicated that federal legislation authorizing states to
maintain groundwater stocks within their borders would be an acceptable
solution. Likewise, interstate compacts were cited as examples of appropriate means for resolution of this problem. Finally, the Court concluded
that water conservation is a legitimate purpose that could justify a state's
prohibition on the exportation of groundwater.
After Sporhase was decided, Judge Howard Bratton struck down New
Mexico's statute prohibiting exportation of groundwater. The case was
appealed, but because the challenged statute was repealed and a new
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statute passed, that new statute is now under attack in the Federal District
Court.
The Sporhase case conveys the following message loud and clear: if
a state wishes to maintain its groundwater resources, it must establish
control by asserting a proprietary interest in those resources. The committee has isolated three constitutionally acceptable methods for asserting
this interest. The first method (Recommendation no. 1) is to have Congress authorize maintenance of water within a state's boundaries. The
second method (Recommendation no. 2) is for New Mexico to negotiate
a compact with the appropriate sister state and have that compact approved
by Congress. The third method (recommended for further study but not
immediate implementation) is state appropriation. In Sporhase, the Supreme Court ruled that the "public ownership" which states like New
Mexico had relied upon as a basis for exclusive use of the water within
the state was little more than a "legal fiction." Actual appropriation by
a state of its groundwater would convert the asserted ownership from
"legal fiction" to reality and give the state the control necessary to conserve for its future needs.
The need to conserve water for the future is a function of the amount
of current and future demand. In light of Sporhase, anticipated demand
must be extended to include out-of-state as well as in-state demand. This
report analyzes out-of-state demand and summarizes projected water deficits in states neighboring New Mexico together with a discussion of the
possible implications of those deficits for New Mexico. These numbers
are taken from each state's most recent water plan. The absence of a
comparably large number for Colorado results from the fact that Colorado
did not attempt to quantify their deficits in most cases, simply noting the
large number of municipalities that faced water quantity problems.
The magnitude of these deficits makes inescapable the conclusion that
economies in these areas face very serious adjustment problems over the
next four decades. It is understandable that planners in these states would
look for every possible means for mitigating these problems, and, to a
large degree, water importation may be the only option available for
obtaining anything close to the large quantities of water needed to eliminate these deficits other than by reducing demand. One result of these
pressures is that Arizona and Texas have explicitly made importation of
water part of their state water policy, and Oklahoma has been considering
a major intrastate water transfer plan that would bring water to its arid
western region.
In this context, it should certainly be expected that increased attention
will be paid by neighboring states and their political subdivisions to New
Mexico water resources through applications to appropriate unappropriated water in New Mexico, purchase of water rights, or by whatever
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other means might seem effective (e.g., equitable apportionment suits as
in Colorado v. New Mexico on the Vermejo).
Obviously, New Mexico's sister states will not or, for a variety of
reasons, could not look to water importation from New Mexico as a
means for resolving all of their water problems. There are both legal and
economic obstacles to such plans. Yet, as the more detailed discussion
infra indicates, these obstacles may not prove to be adequate barriers to
such schemes. The degree of risk is demonstrably large in the case of
unappropriated groundwater, though substantially less in the case of interstate streams protected by compacts.
At a minimum, water shortages of the magnitude indicated will clearly
affect the competitive climate among western states vis-a-vis water. Moreover, most of the states contiguous to New Mexico have more highly
developed economies with a correspondingly greater ability to overcome
legal and economic obstacles to importation. Prudence dictates that New
Mexicans recognize the character of this changing climate related to water
deficits in neighboring states and their possible implications for the State
of New Mexico. What now is a concern largely confined to areas near
borders of sister states may conceivably expand to other areas of the state
as water becomes steadily more valuable in neighboring states. The state
of New Mexico must take action to respond to this possible expansion.
B. Recommendations
1) The state should make every effort possible to have the Congress
of the United States act in some way to allow New Mexico to maintain
its water resources within its boundaries.
Rationale. The Supreme Court has concluded that Congress should act
in this area to resolve this type of interstate conflict; Congress has acted
in the past to allow states to maintain water exclusively within their
boundaries through approval of interstate compacts as well as through
direct legislation. This is the simplest and most direct method of resolution
of the problem.
2) The state should enter into compact negotiations with the state of
Texas to clarify the division of surface water of the Rio Grande below
Elephant Butte Dam and thereby clarify the status of the related groundwater as well.
Rationale. The El Paso v. Reynolds decision creates uncertainty as to
the nature of the division of surface waters of the Rio Grande below
Elephant Butte Dam. A compact with Texas would provide the certainty
that would be in the interest of both states and would clarify the status
of related unappropriated groundwater since surface rights would have
to be purchased and retired as the groundwater is pumped.
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3. The state should fund immediately a study of the possibility of state
appropriation of unappropriated groundwater and investment of the capital
necessary to extract and distribute the water. State appropriation is recommended only for study and not immediate implementation. This method
is considered as a means of last resort if neither a federal solution nor
an interstate compact could be reached.
Rationale. If neither a federal solution nor an interstate compact can
be obtained, New Mexico will be faced with a choice. It can either stand
back and let an interstate market determine the future of all of its unappropriated water resources, or it can enter the interstate market and
appropriate and develop sufficient water supplies for the needs of future
generations. Both Sporhase and other Supreme Court decisions support
the constitutionality of such a method. A study of this possibililty and its
legal, hydrologic and economic effects is therefore recommended.
4) The state should act immediately to place a five year moratorium
on the granting of new permits for unappropriated groundwater where
there is hydrologic uncertainty, where excessive demand exceeds water
supply, and where there is confusion regarding the State's allocation of
the water. Such a moratorium should not be allowed to affect existing
vested water rights, and should allow appropriations for emergencies.
The geographic extent of such a moratorium is a legislative judgment.
The area of greatest stress is the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Dam
because: a) there is presently great hydrologic uncertainty, and an ongoing
United States Geological Survey study will clarify this situation within
five years; b) the number of competing applications for groundwater far
exceeds available supply; and c) there is confusion as to the effect of the
existing compact over the surface water of the Rio Grande at and below
Elephant Butte Dam. These surface waters are directly related to the
unappropriated groundwater.
Rationale. Before an arid state like New Mexico should allocate any
underground waters, it must have good hydrologic information. This
information is not yet available in some areas of the state. A moratorium
would give time to develop this information.
Where, as in the Lower Rio Grande, applications far exceed supply,
a compact clarification could define the legal status of all applicants and
make achievement of the goal of efficient allocation and conservation a
reality. A moratorium would give the needed time for negotiation of such
a compact.
Various proposals are before Congress to regulate the interstate transfer
of water rights. The Supreme Court has stated that Congress is an appropriate vehicle for resolving this problem. A moratorium would give
time for Congress to act to resolve this problem and would avoid extensive
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litigation costs as well as protect capital investors who might invest in
water projects only to be undercut by congressional action.
Finally, a moratorium would give the needed time to study the possibility of the state's entry into the water market as a participant to
conserve water for the future if the alternatives of federal legislation and
interstate compact should fail.
The economic consequences for New Mexico that would accompany
a moratorium on new appropriations are not easily defined because of
the legal confusion that surrounds groundwater in areas such as the Lower
Rio Grande. If the legal issues are set aside, however, the economic
analysis is straightforward. Without a moratorium groundwater in the
Mesilla Bolson might be put to various uses which would generate economic value. With a moratorium these values would obviously not be
generated and the state's economy would not realize these values, thereby
incurring a "cost," referred to in economic terminology as an opportunity
cost reflecting the value of the opportunity that is lost.
To estimate the opportunity cost to New Mexico arising from a five
year moratorium in the Lower Rio Grande, three scenarios were constructed regarding the extent and type of use of newly appropriated
groundwater that would occur in the absence of a moratorium. These
scenarios assumed respectively that 1) no new New Mexico uses would
occur as a result of either El Paso's being granted a permit or continued
legal ambiguity in the courts; or 2) that both new irrigation and municipal/
industrial permits would be granted to New Mexicans, but there would
be at least a five year development period before these uses would actually
occur; or 3) that both new irrigation and municipal/industrial permits
would be granted with the irrigation uses beginning immediately. Only
the last, least likely scenario would produce opportunity costs as a result
of a moratorium.
HYDROLOGIC FACTORS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF WATER RIGHTS IN NON-STREAM-RELATED AND
STREAM-RELATED AQUIFERS
As a part of the committee's efforts to determine the extent of the
problem facing the state, the State Engineer was asked to provide data
concerning the amount of unappropriated groundwater available in New
Mexico. As became clear, calculation of the amount of unappropriated
groundwater is a difficult task, requiring a combination of hydrologic
estimates and knowledge of administrative records. For this reason this
section on groundwater hydrology and administration is included as background for discussion that follows.
The following summarizes the hydrologic factors that must be consid-
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ered in any effort to administer water rights in a non-artesian groundwater
basin, whether stream-related or not. The technical aspects are greatly
simplified, with emphasis placed on broad concepts rather than technical
precision.
A. Non-Stream-RelatedAquifers
A "non-stream-related aquifer" is one which receives no recharge from
outside its area via a through-flowing stream, nor is it drained by one.
Such an aquifer is recharged only by precipitation in its own drainage
area and, in the extreme case, is drained only by evaporation and transpiration. An example of such an aquifer is the body of saturated rocks
in the Estancia Basin of New Mexico, which is a topographically closed
basin with no stream flowing in or out.
Withdrawal of groundwater from an aquifer that is not stream-related
is easy to understand, and the factors which must be considered in administration of such withdrawals are relatively simple.
The groundwater stored in such an aquifer may be withdrawn through
wells, but its withdrawal is analogous to the mining of a mineral deposit.
Production at any rate in excess of recharge, which is usually extremely
small compared to the rate of pumping, results in an equal reduction of
the volume in storage. Conceivably, an amount equal to the annual recharge could be pumped each year so that the volume of water in storage
did not change. In practice, however, recharge is so small that any useful
development of this type of groundwater can be thought of as a net
withdrawal from storage, or "mining." As a practical matter, groundwater
in a non-stream-related aquifer is a finite resource.
The administrator of water rights in such a basin, in supervising the
mining of the groundwater, must ascertain the volume available and
attempt to regulate the places and rates of pumping in order to maintain
production for some predetermined period and to minimize interference
among appropriators.
It may be helpful at this point to discuss the mechanism governing
movement of water in the aquifer. If the non-stream-related aquifer behaved as a simple container of water, having insignificant discharge, then
pumping would reduce the volume of water causing the water level to
fall evenly and immediately. But such is not the case for actual aquifers.
Water is not free to move rapidly enough in a real aquifer to allow the
water level (or "head") at one well to be distributed instantaneously and
equally over the aquifer. Instead, the water is generally present in the
small spaces between the grains of either unconsolidated sediments or
porous rocks. Pumping of a particular well produces a "cone of depression." This cone is a depression in the surface of the water level at every
point in the aquifer. The shape and dimensions of the cone are governed
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by the rate of pumping and by two principal characteristics of the aquifer's
material: its transmissivity and its storage coefficient. Transmissivity is
a measure of the rate at which water moves through the aquifer in response
to a difference in the head between any two points. The storage coefficient
is a measure of the volume of water that a unit area of the aquifer will
release from (or accept into) storage in response to a unit change in head.
To return to the case of the non-stream-related aquifer, it should be
noted that the effects of the interrelated cones of depression are as important as the total volume of water available in the aquifer. The effects
of pumping a particular well can be calculated. Consequently, the administrator may choose to regulate wells so that these effects are widely
distributed and result in a general lowering of the water level thereby
allowing all appropriators to pump for about the same length of time. At
a minimum he may choose to prevent substantial interference of one well
upon others.
The kinds of aquifers that exist range from the non-stream-related
aquifer described above at one end of a continuum to aquifers for which
the interrelationship with surface waters is very important because of a
sizable, nearby stream. The continuum reaches a limit at the other extreme
in which there is no aquifer. A stream simply passes over impermeable
rocks which contain and transmit virtually no water. In order to understand
all cases between the two extremes, a fuller explanation of the movement
of groundwater, as influenced by change in head, transmissivity, and
storage coefficient, is required.
The best image of an aquifer is as a container filled with saturated
sand. The rate at which the aquifer material will permit water to move
through it between one point and another is a function of the difference
in head, or water level, between the two points. Gravity is the force that
causes the flow. Transmissivity, once again, is the rate of flow, through
a section the full thickness of the aquifer and of unit width, in response
to a unit difference in head. Transmissivity depends on the distribution
of grain-sizes in the material, the degree to which it contains natural
cementing, the degree of fracturing, and a variety of other physical factors
including, of course, the thickness of the aquifer. A thick aquifer will
transmit proportionally more water than a thin one of the same material,
given the same difference in head between points.
The range in transmissivity is enormous, from near zero in extremely
fine-grained materials (clay, or unfractured shale) to high values in thick
sections of clean, well-rounded, uniformly sized gravel. Transmissivity
may be expressed in various units, the most convenient here being gallons
per day per foot (gpd/ft). The values of transmissivity commonly seen
in New Mexico range from a few gpd/ft for aquifers in which the weakest
of usable domestic or livestock wells may be located, up to values on
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the order of 1,000,000 gpd/ft for the thickest and most productive aquifers
of the Rio Grande trough.
The other principal aquifer characteristic, the storage coefficient, is
expressed as a fraction. For the aquifers that are considered here this
coefficient is essentially the same as the volume of water that will drain
by gravity, expressed as a fraction of a unit volume of the saturated
aquifer material. For the aquifers dealt with here, the storage coefficient
is generally in the range 0.1 to 0.3. Again, this is equivalent to saying
that a cubic foot of saturated aquifer material would contain from about
0.1 to 0.3 cubic feet of water, which can be drained from it by gravity.
The effects of transmissivity and storage coefficient upon the shape of
a cone of depression can be pictured by considering the limiting cases.
As transmissivity approaches infinity, the aquifer can transmit water so
rapidly that water levels adjust very quickly in all parts, and the cone is
nearly flat. All other things being equal, a well in a high-transmissivity
aquifer will have less effect, in terms of drawdown of nearby wells, than
if it were in an aquifer of lower transmissivity. But, of course, the effects
at any particular moment will be felt further away, because of the rapid
expansion of the cone. On the other hand, if transmissivity is low, the
cone will be relatively deep and steep near a pumping well because the
movement of water requires a large head difference from point to point.
When a pump in a new well is turned on, the head in the well and the
aquifer adjacent to it moves rapidly downward producing a difference in
head between the well and more distant points in the aquifer. Gravity
will cause water to flow from the higher heads in the aquifer away from
the well, down to the lower head in the well. At a short distance from
the well, the perimeter through which the water is flowing is small.
Because the volume of water moving across any perimeter in a particular
period of time must always equal the volume pumped (otherwise there
would be a "hole" left somewhere), the difference in head between two
points in the path of flow must be relatively large. That is, if transmissivity
is fixed, then the amount of water that moves across a perimeter is a
function of the difference in head. Near a well the perimeter is small, so
the head difference must be large in order to move the same amount of
water across it as will be moved across a much longer perimeter, far from
the well, by a small head difference. As a consequence, the slope of the
cone is steepest near the well, and flattens out as with distance from the
well until it intersects the water table. The cone of depression, then, is
not a "right circular cone," but is instead a cone with increasing slope
toward the "point of pumping." When the pump is turned on, the cone
starts to expand. Its perimeter moves outward very rapidly at first but at
an ever-decreasing rate. The volume of the cone is established by the
storage coefficient and by recharge. Ignoring recharge for the moment,
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the volume of the cone (i.e., the volume of the aquifer that has been
dewatered) is equal to the volume of water pumped divided by the storage
coefficient. If the storage coefficient were at a typical value, say 0.2,
then the volume of the cone would be 5 times the volume of water
withdrawn from it.
The perimeter of the cone moves outward at a continually decreasing
rate. This condition occurs because the volume of a cone increases much
more rapidly than its perimeter; and, therefore, if the change in volume
is at a constant rate (the pumping rate is held constant) the perimeter
expands more and more slowly.
The cone continues to expand until the pumping reaches equilibrium
with the recharge to the aquifer. If there is no substantial recharge, as in
the non-stream-related aquifer, the cone will continue to grow.
The characteristics of an aquifer may be estimated from its geologic
makeup and may be measured in a number of ways. In general, the
measurement involves determining the position and slope of the cone of
depression in response to a known pumping stress, or determining the
head difference between points that is resulting in a known rate of movement of water, and working backward to find transmissivity and storage
coefficient.
B. Stream-Related Aquifers
A stream-related aquifer may be imagined as a large sand-filled tub
with a stream of water running across its surface. The stream is supplied
from some source outside the system that drains into the land overlying
the aquifer.
Assume, to begin with, that the aquifer is fully saturated and that the
flow of the stream is constant, inflow matching outflow. Assume further
that at some time in the past, the water with which the sand is now
saturated was brought in by the stream, and that the stream's outflow
must have been less than the inflow while that was occurring. It follows
that if the sand is ever less than fully saturated, the stream will replenish
it, (the stream will sink into the sand) and during the period of replenishment there will be less flow in the stream across the tub (possibly none
at all) and less (or even no) outflow. While recognizing that there is a
large volume of water in storage in the aquifer, none of it can be withdrawn
without inducing a corresponding reduction in the total flow of the stream
to replace it. Thus, if a well were put down into the tub, water could be
taken out, but the stream will flow downward into the sand to replace
the water removed.
Although this process seems clear enough in considering a tub full of
sand, the operations are somewhat more subtle in a natural system. At
this point in the discussion the cone of depression must be reintroduced.
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A new well drilled and pumping in the stream-related aquifer will cause
a cone of depression to form. The cone will grow, as described above,
as water is taken from storage in the aquifer. (For the purpose of this
discussion, it is assumed that the water produced from the well is the net
amount removed from the system and is not permitted to return to the
aquifer.) If the well is some distance from the stream, for a period of
time (which can be calculated because the radius of the cone can be
determined at any time if pumping rate, transmissivity, and storage coefficient are known) the cone will represent only withdrawal from storage.
At some time, however, the periphery of the cone will arrive at the stream.
At that point a difference will be produced between the head of water in
the stream and the head just inside the edge of the cone of depression.
Water will start to flow from the stream into the cone, or cease to flow
from the aquifer into the stream. The cone will continue to expand with
continued pumping of the well until an equilibrium is reached in which
the recharge balances the pumping. As the stream is the source of recharge, just as in the tub analogy, the cone will expand until its periphery
along the stream is long enough, and the head gradient is sufficient, to
cause a flow from the stream into the cone that is equal to the rate of
pumping from the well. In other words, just as the stream across the tub
flowed down into the sand to replace water taken out, a stream will flow
down into the cone of depression of a related groundwater well. The
length of time before an equilibrium is reached is a function of many
variables including the distance between the well and the stream.
It is a useful concept, incidentally, to think of the stream as part of
the aquifer. While the common notion holds that a river is a self-contained
entity, with even a certain dominance in natural and human affairs, it is
clear that the river is allowed to exist only to the extent that it keeps up
with its duties in recharging its stream-related aquifer.
Once the well's cone has reached an equilibrium size and shape, all
of the pumping is balanced by flow diverted from the stream. Using the
tub analogy again, if a well is drilled and keeps dewatering the sand from
one point source, the water eventually flows directly from the stream to
the well. Eventually there is no difference, given the simplifying assumptions that have been made, between a right to withdraw groundwater
from the well, as described, and a right to divert from the stream at the
same rate. A crucialpoint here, however, is that in advance of the equilibrium (before all water is coming directly from the stream) the two
rights are not the same. Until the perimeter of the cone reaches the stream,
the volume of the cone represents a volume of water which has been
taken from storage in the aquifer, over and above the subsequent diversions from the river. It is this volume that may be called "groundwater
depletion." This "groundwater depleted" before the stream is completely
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affected by pumping is what is commonly called stream-related unappropriated groundwater. While the groundwater was originally made
available by the stream, that event occurred far enough in the past that
the water in storage can legally be considered groundwater.
The timing of impact on the river varies greatly, depending on pumping
rate, aquifer characteristics, and distance from the stream. High transmissivity hastens the contribution by the stream. Greater distance results
in a larger cone, later onset of diversion from the stream, and therefore
a larger "groundwater depletion." Generally, if the wells are distant from
the stream, the scale of timing before their influence is felt is measured
in tens or hundreds of years.
Based upon an understanding of this hydrologic situation, the water
administrator may allow certain actions. The withdrawal of this unappropriated groundwater can make currently available a large amount of
water that could otherwise never be used, though only at the cost of some
diversion from the stream sooner or later. The amount of groundwater
that can be made available depends upon the locations of wells, pumping
rates, aquifer properties, and, most importantly, the rate of diversion from
the stream that can be allowed at any particular time without impairing
pre-existing surface rights on the stream. "Mining" has a different meaning with respect to a stream-related aquifer. When you mine from a nonstream-related aquifer, you have no obligation to pay it back. When you
mine from a stream-related aquifer, you are incurring some type of obligation to the stream.
Even though a well may produce only from stored groundwater for a
period, with the diversion of streamflow delayed until a later time, the
cumulative production from the well will eventually approach the cumulative volume diverted from the stream. Eventually only stream water
will be drawn from the well. Thus, the administrator must consider that
mining of the groundwater in storage will some day be equivalent to a
perpetual right to withdraw from the stream, thereby requiring offsetting
action to prevent impairment of surface rights.
Even if the groundwater withdrawal were limited, either in time or
volume, so that the well production was entirely from groundwater storage
and was stopped as the effect reached the stream, a cone of depression
would still exist at the end of pumping that would ultimately refill. The
water to fill it will come, in this simplified picture, from the stream. Even
if the cone were to be refilled by transfer of water from elsewhere in the
aquifer, it would still affect the stream because the head over the entire
area would be lowered, eventually creating a head difference at the stream
resulting in movement of water from the stream into the aquifer.
The most conservative position in the administration of the aquifer
would not contemplate any allowance for the pumpage from storage, and
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would treat all withdrawal from groundwater as if drawn directly from
the stream. In the case of a fully-appropriated stream this would mean
that any permit to appropriate groundwater would be subject to the retirement, at once, of an equal right in the stream.
A more liberal position (still consistent with the requirement of preserving existing surface rights to the stream) would be to calculate the
effect upon streamflow year-by-year, and require retirement of rights
according to that schedule. It would even be theoretically possible, because of the lag in effects upon the stream, to allow pumping at rates
higher than the total depletion available in the stream for limited time
periods. Yet the administrator faces several uncertainties when he allows
pumpage of groundwater in excess of the water rights in the stream that
can be retired to offset the effect of pumping. In addition to the large
uncertainties in the calculations required to determine the effects upon
the stream, he must be sure that the scheduled retirement of surface rights
is timed so that the schedule matches the effects. Further, he must have
adequate means to guarantee that the required retirements in the distant
future can and will occur. If the administrator errs in this regard, the
stream may disappear entirely for periods of time until a balance is
reestablished.
A second related problem is that the stream may carry waters that are
committed to downstream users, beyond the limits of the aquifer system
and perhaps beyond the administrator's jurisdiction, e.g., the share of
water committed to Mexico from the Rio Grande. In such cases, great
care must be exercised if permits are issued to appropriate groundwater
in excess of the rights retired year-by-year. A stream will not answer
priority calls. If the effect of pumping exceeds retired rights, in the natural
system the first duty of water in the stream will be to recharge the aquifer,
in utter disregard of the priorities of legal claimants.
It should be recognized that the unappropriated groundwater available
may be only a small fraction of the total volume in storage depending
on transmissivity, the storage coefficient, and the distance from the wells
to the stream.
The State Engineer has provided the committee with information regarding unappropriated water available in New Mexico in non-streamrelated aquifers as well as stream-related aquifers. These data should be
viewed as illustrative, rather than definitive, due to the generalized nature
of the underlying hydrologic assumptions. As a general summary, the
remaining non-stream related basins that contain substantial quantities of
appropriate groundwater are in the southern portion of New Mexico. The
stream-related aquifers in the Rio Grande (in all subregions), the Pecos,
and the San Juan all contain appropriate groundwater of varying amounts.
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WATER DEFICITS IN NEIGHBORING STATES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR NEW MEXICO
A. Out-of-State Demandfor New Mexico's Water Resources: The Past
and Implicationsfor the Future
New Mexico's surface water resources are essentially fully appropriated
as are much of its groundwater resources, with only a few exceptions.
Water resources in states contiguous to New Mexico are also largely fully
appropriated. As a consequence, existing and anticipated future water
deficits in these states may provide strong incentives for those states to
consider the potential for importing New Mexico waters as a means for
easing their water storages. Therefore, it is important to understand the
nature of present and future water "needs" in those states and the intentions--expressed or implied--of those states vis-d-vis interstate transfers.
Equally important are the limits on these states' economic and legal
capacities for implementing any efforts to import water from New Mexico.
1) New Mexico Water Resources: If They Are Not Put to Beneficial
Use, They Can be Lost
To set the stage for inquiry into the potentially competitive interaction
between New Mexico and her sister states regarding water supplies, it is
useful to begin with two observations concerning New Mexico's ability
to exercise control over water resources within its boundaries. In the case
of groundwater, the now familiar El Paso case raises serious questions
as to the state's ability to limit the use of this resource to in-state uses.
Equally threatening to a sense of security regarding the water resources
of the state is the fact that even in-state historic use of water resources
may not fully protect the state's control over water in interstate streams
not subject to an interstate compact. The Special Master's opinion in
Colorado v. New Mexico' contains the notion that use per se does not
absolutely protect the state's right to water-the use must also be "efficient." Although higher courts may reverse both the El Paso and Colorado decisions, to date, as they stand, they have the effect of eroding
the state's sense of security in its ability to plan for, and control, water
resources for the long-term interests of New Mexico.
2) Out-of-State Interest in New Mexico's Water Resources:
Unmistakable Demand
If El Paso and Colorado are, in some sense, special cases, and no
other interests in neighboring states are likely to seek New Mexico's
water supplies, then the threat to overall water supply may not be per1. State of Colorado v. State of New Mexico, et al, Report of the Special Master on the Equitable
Apportionment of the Vermejo River, December 31, 1981.
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vasive, even though substantial in the two cases cited. In this regard, the
relevant questions become: 1) Are there other examples of out-of-state
interest in acquiring New Mexico water supplies? 2) Is there any evidence
that suggests the "water deficit climate" in neighboring states may result
in growing pressures for these states to become interested in New Mexico's water resources as a means for resolving their water deficit problems?
a. Expressed out-of-state demandfor New Mexico water supply. Consider first the actual expressed (as contrasted with "potential") out-ofstate interest in the acquisition of New Mexico's water supplies. The
following examples serve to demonstrate the nature of out-of-state requests for New Mexico's water over the last 16 years.
-October 10, 1967. The City of Friona, Texas, concerned with their
dependence on groundwater supplies which are ". . . becoming more
limited over the years . . ," applies for water in New Mexico's Ute
Reservoir.
-March, 1978. The Hudspeth Irrigation District, east of El Paso,
Texas, inquires as to the possibility of acquiring water rights held by
Albuquerque.
-February 25, 1980. The Llano Estacado Water District in Texas
applied for water in the Ute Reservoir to serve water needs in rural areas
in Oldham and Deaf Smith Counties, Texas.
-Summer, 1980. The Houston Natural Gas Corporation seeks water
rights held by Albuquerque for a coal slurry pipeline extending from
Northwestern New Mexico to Southern Texas.
-February 26, 1981. The San Marco Pipeline Company initiates efforts to appropriate groundwater in Colorado, some 9 miles north of the
New Mexico border, the effect of which could be a reduction in New
Mexico's share of flows in the Rio Grande, for the purpose of establishing
a coal slurry pipeline between Colorado and Texas.
-July 22, 1983. An attorney, representing (unnamed) clients in Texas,
inquires about the possibility of obtaining water from the Ute and/or
Conchas Reservoir(s).
-July 27, 1983. The city of Bovina, Texas, some 20 miles east of
Clovis, New Mexico, seeks to purchase water from the Ute Reservoir
with the appeal that ". . . our town is in dire need of an additional water
supply in the near future.
It should be noted that all of these examples focus on currently unused
surface water in New Mexico rather than groundwater, which is the
principal subject of this report. Moreover, in the case of Ute Reservoir
water there is an interstate compact which apportions the surface flow of
the Canadian River among the states. Where a compact expressly authorizes an embargo of water by the participating states, a state relying
on such a provision is on strong legal ground.
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The examples cited above belie any notion that out-of-state interest in
New Mexico water supplies is confined to the Colorado and El Paso
cases. Yet, these examples focus simply on actual inquiries/applications
regarding New Mexico water supplies. What potential demands exist that
have not yet reached the point of articulation or action?
b) Potential demand for New Mexico's water supply. In considering
the potential magnitude and character of out-of-state demands for New
Mexico's water supplies, it is instructive to examine the attitudes and
policies in neighboring states relating to water transfers and out-of-state
acquisitions.
The State of Arizona has long-standing interests in inter-basin water
transfers. Planning for the Central Arizona Project began in the early
1960s. Particularly important for our present discussions are expected
water deficits in Arizona's Southeastern Counties2 (detailed in the Appendix) and Arizona's policies/strategies for dealing with these deficits.
The following excerpts from Arizona's State Water Plan are relevant in
this regard.
Substantial supplementation of the state's dependable water supply
will require either augmentation from outside the state or modification
of climatic watershed conditions to generate additional surface water
run off within the state.... Comparison of total projected water
depletions with projected water supplies shows that substantial overdrafting of groundwater will continue unless uses are severely
reduced or the supplies available to the state are augmented by large
importations (emphasis added).3
Although Arizona has substantially altered its groundwater code since
these words were written with the express intent of reducing its groundwater overdrafting, it remains to be seen whether the implementation of
the code will actually achieve its goal. Augmentation of supply from outof-state sources is likely to be an alternative more politically expedient
than conservation, regardless of the method used in achieving conservation. Thus, out-of-state importations of water should continue to be
viewed as an important option for meeting expected water deficits in
Arizona. Little imagination is required to anticipate the direction in which
Arizona might look for a source of water to meet expected deficits in
eastern-particularly southeastern--counties. Here again, it should be
stated that a compact as well as court rulings provide substantial protection
for surface supplies. Unappropriated groundwater, however, is not so
clearly protected.
2. See Arizona Water Commission, Arizona State Water Plan:Alternative Futures(Phase Jn, Feb.
1977).
3. Id. at 5 and 15.
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Texas' interest in water importation also began in the 1960s. 4 In the
1983 Texas water plan, the importation of water remains as a central
alternative to be considered as a means for resolving the state's water
deficits; for example:
The Texas Department of Water Resources ... will continue, expand
and refine interstate. . . water development and water transfer planning ... (emphasis added).
Interestingly, such planning studies for interstate water transfers are to
be conducted in "cooperation" with other states and will give "...
adequate emphasis and consideration to the water problems and needs of
those states that are located in the basins of origin of potential water
supplies for importation (emphasis added)." 6 This desire for cooperation
reflects the current eastward orientation of the Texas importation plans
(at the state level) towards the Missouri and Mississippi basins and the
hope that other Ogallala Basin states (including New Mexico) will assist
in bringing those plans to fruition. Yet the same Texas water plan also
states that "importation studies and planning will be based upon the
principle that only quantities offlood water (emphasis added) that will
be surplus to the future needs of basins of origin of potential import water
will be given consideration for importation to Texas." ' In light of El
Paso, New Mexico may find little comfort in the Texas "principle" of
limiting water importations to "excess" flood waters and still less in their
self-imposed commitment to conduct such studies in cooperation with
states-of-origin. Even if a cooperative posture is proposed at the state
level, its sweep does not extend to the political subdivisions of the state.
It must be noted that Texas residents are concerned with the relationship
between water transfer costs and Texas gains from such transfers, as well
as with the question of who pays the costs for water transfers. 8 Notwithstanding these concerns, Texas communities give strong support to the
Department of Water Resources' continuation of efforts to "... . conduct
feasibility studies and analyze legal alternatives for purchasing water from
out of state. "' Further, in a poll of Texas residents, 76% of those polled
agreed with the statement: "The Texas Water Plan should continue to
4. See Texas Dept. of Water Resources, Waterfor Texas: Planningfor the Future(Austin, Texas,
Feb. 1983).
5. Id. at IV-25.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Texas Intergovernmental Work Group, PublicInput toAmend the Texas Water Plan (Austin,
Texas, June 1982).
9. Id. at 3-14.
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consider the importation of surplus water from outside the state to meet
the long range needs of agriculture and other uses ...
"10
Similar emphasis is not given to water importation options in the state
water plans for Colorado t' and Oklahoma. 12 Intra-state water transfer
programs play important roles in the water plans of these two states.
Most notable in Colorado's water management system is their well-known
Colorado-Big Thompson project which transfers water from the western
to the eastern slope of the Rockies. A massive water transfer project for
transferring water to water-deficit counties in the Northwest is under
consideration in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma project would involve an
annual northward, and northwesterly, transfer of some 1.2 million acre
feet of water via approximately 710 miles of canals and approximately
140 miles of pipelines requiring the use of 42 pumping plants. 13 No
evidence of a Utah policy orientation towards water importation was
discovered.
The above discussions bring into sharp focus the policy commitment
of some states contiguous to New Mexico to pursue the water importation
option-this commitment is made explicit in the water plans of Texas
and Arizona. It is tempting, however, because of legal and practical
realities to regard as fanciful the interpretation of these commitments to
consider water importation options as constituting a real, meaningful
"threat" to New Mexico's water supplies. Such a position might be based
on the arguments that importations will be limited by 1) legal considerations (e.g. state statutes and compacts), or 2) economic considerations
in that the costs of water transportation systems will limit feasible importations to but a few miles, or 3) the notion that, for many groundwater
aquifers, supplies are not dependable in that they are effectively nonrecharging. These arguments warrant consideration.
As for legal considerations, interstate compacts, which are congressionally approved instruments for dividing the surface flow of interstate
rivers, are common to the West. Where absent, there often will be an
equitable apportionment decree of the United States Supreme Court that
accomplishes the same division. In either case, there has been an explicit
consent of one or another federal branch to the division of water. As
indicated above, although questioned by some authorities, these federally
approved divisions would seem to offer a fair measure of protection for
a state's "share" of a river.
10. Id. at 4-50.
11. State of Colorado and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Water for Tomorrow: Colorado State
Water Plan, Phase I AppraisalReport (USDI, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1974).
12. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan, Publ. No. 94
(Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 1, 1980).
13. Id. at 173.
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However, two qualifications to this conclusion must be made. The first,
and most damaging, is that compacts that divide surface flow do not
necessarily divide related groundwater. Unless the language of a compact
or judicial decision is clear and unequivocal, compacts and decrees may
offer little protection to a state's groundwater supplies.
A second qualification is more speculative, though it would be substantially more far reaching. Namely, most of the compacts and decrees
were negotiated or judicially argued during an era of water development
when the predominant social task was the capture and beneficial use of
unused flows of rivers. As a precondition to their development, Congress
often demanded that disputes among states be settled. Yet the modem
condition of western rivers is full appropriation. New uses for water,
however, continue to arise. In this new political environment, more accurately termed an era of water management and reallocation in contrast
with the earlier epoch of water development, there may be pressure to
interpret disputed compact provisions in the manner that promotes interstate reallocation rather than state control.
As for the economic argument, the general question is: to what extent
have costs, relative to returns or benefits, historically limited the construction of water reclamation projects? There is much evidence that cost/
benefit ratios have not always been important in decisions regarding water
projects. Costs do not seem to have effectively limited water reclamation
projects constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation. From a sample of 28
projects constructed by the Bureau, Burness et al., show that on average,
direct benefits were but 72% of costs and, for 10 of the 28 projects, direct
benefits were less than 50% of costs.' 4
Looking, more specifically, to water transfer programs, the State of
Arizona continues to support the Central Arizona Project (CAP) despite
research results reported by University of Arizona agricultural economists
that concluded that costs were far in excess of benefits, and that proposed
agricultural users of CAP water would be unable to pay even the subsidized costs of the project.' 5 The state's support of the CAP continues
even after later "second thoughts" by Arizona citizens concerning the
economic feasibility of the project. 16
A more contemporary example of a state's willingness to consider a
water transfer project which, on its face, would seem to be without merit
14. Bumess, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, The "New" Arizona v. California: Practicably
IrrigableAcreage and Economic Feasibility,22 NAT. RES. J. 520 (1982).
15. See Martin & Young, The Needfor Additional Water in the Arid Southwest: An Economist's
Dissent, 3 THE ANNALS OF REGIONAL SCI. 22-31 (1969), and The Economics of Arizona's
Water Problem, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 9-18 (1967). See also, CAP Should Not Be Built Say Two at
the U. of A., Tucson Daily Citizen, Feb. 17, 1967.
16. See Do We Need More?, Arizona Daily Star, Tucson, Aug. 5, 1973, and State's Water
Quandary Needs SharperFocus, The Arizona Daily Star, Tucson, July 12, 1973.
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if evaluated strictly on the basis of benefit-cost comparisons is seen in
the above-cited transfer project under current study in Oklahoma. The
proposed project for the north, northwest transfer of 1.2 million acre feet
is expected to yield annual direct benefits of $58 million, at an annualized
cost of $365 million--direct benefits are but 16% of costs. 17 Even considering indirect benefits that accrue to a community, state, region, or
nation from such projects, they are unlikely to be so great as to make up
this large difference.
Finally, there are constructed water transfer projects which have failed
the test of "benefits greater than costs."' 8 Whether the water project is
planned or constructed, the discussion above suggests that New Mexico
cannot rely on economic or legal considerations as absolute barriers to
neighboring states' use of the importation option for relieving their water
shortage problems. It may be that, in the West, water is viewed differently
from most commodities-water is essentially viewed as priceless. For
example, in their analysis of attitudes about water in Arizona, Arizona
scholars suggest that:
Whatever the development of water supply is estimated to cost,
Westerners tend to think it is worth the price. They believe that if
water becomes too expensive, everything else will become yet more
dear, and were they to lack a sufficient supply of this basic ingredient
(water), they would be unable to reap the profits that come with
enterprise and development. In short, water is conceived by Westerners as a coveted commodity, a worthy prize for which they are
pay-offs may
willing to engage in demanding political games, where
come only far into the future. (Emphasis added) 19
It should be emphasized, however, that in recent times the politics for
implementation of water development projects has demonstrably changed
in at least one fundamental respect. Virtually all of the early large interbasin projects were built through federal appropriations. Now, though
the specifics of cost-sharing have not been worked out, the beneficiaries
of new federal projects may be expected to pay a substantial share of the
cost of these projects. While Westerners may have been willing to pay
any price for projects funded through the federal tax dollar, it is less clear
that they would be willing to pay those costs when they must be paid
much more directly and heavily with their own dollars. Texas voters have
on more than one occasion turned down major capital expenditures that
17. Values are in 1978 dollars; costs are calculated over 100 years at a 6-/s% discount rate. See
Oklahoma Water Resources Board, note 12 supra.
18. Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, UnitedStates ReclamationPolicy andIndian Water
Rights, 20 NAT. RES. J. 807 (1980).
19. Martin, Ingram & Laney, A Willingness to Play:Analysis of Water Resources Development,
7 W. ECON. J. 137 (1982).
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would have initiated implementation of elements of the High Plains importation plan. Also, Oklahoma has yet to approve its large intrastate
plan. Cutting the other way, the substantial severance tax reserves of
many western states may lead to a willingness on the part of the states
themselves to subsidize water projects. Montana, for example, has recently acted to permit the use of severance tax funds for up-front financing
of water projects. At a minimum, it is clear that massive expensive
importation plans will receive more scrutiny now than in the past and
that an actual political consensus for their construction will be more
difficult to achieve.
Finally there is the argument that the finite nature of many of New
Mexico's non-stream related aquifers makes them unattractive to prospective out-of-state demanders. Certainly perpetual rights are generally
more desirable to municipalities than are rights limited by the water
available in essentially non-recharging aquifers. However, perpetual rights
to streamflow may be more costly, politically as well as economically,
in that the vested rights to streamflow must be transferred away from an
existing holder, commonly engaged in irrigated agriculture. While acquisition of perpetual rights may ultimately be necessary, use of finite
groundwater supplies can postpone that action, possibly for a long period.
The above discussion sketches the potential conflicts between New
Mexico and her neighboring states arising from competition for scarce
water supplies. It provides an objective basis for New Mexico's concern
that neighboring states have an actual or potential interest in pursuing
water importation plans. While most concrete examples of out-of-state
interest in New Mexico water resources apply to surface waters, it would
be imprudent to believe that the incentives for out-of-state efforts to
acquire surface water would not apply with similar force to New Mexico's
groundwater resources-one need look only to increasing water deficits
acknowledged by neighboring states and' their likely consequences as
revealed most clearly by the El Paso applications. Further, the above
discussion of interstate compacts suggests that surface waters are more
legally secure than groundwater. The likelihood of an increasingly competitive climate for water resources is supported by the actual out-of-state
requests for rights to acquire New Mexico's water resources and surrounding state water policies which mandate the pursuit of water importation options.
Two conflicting forces that bear strongly upon the extent of out-ofstate demands have been noted. The first is the tendency among Westerners to view water as priceless, thereby making politically feasible many
development plans, notwithstanding the traditional cost/benefit criterion.
On the other hand, there is the prospective shift in project development
cost from the federal government to state governments and, more gen-
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TABLE 1
WATER DEFICITS IN STATES NEIGHBORING NEW MEXICO
Expected Water Deficits
(1,000 a.f. per year)
1990

2020

14
108
784
795
353

1,195
2,493
2,508
1,987
1,383

2,054

9,566

63-152
126-508
57-49

44-339
33-734
27-599

246-709

104-1,672

COLORADO

2.3 (plus?)

9.0 (plus?)

OKLAHOMA

112-253

State/Region
TEXAS
Canadian River Basin
Red River Basin
Brazos River Basin
Colorado River Basin
Rio Grande Basin
(sub-total)
ARIZONA
District 2 (Tucson)
District 6
District 5
(sub-total)

TOTAL

2,414.3-3,018.3

607-748
10,286-11,995

erally, to those benefitting from the water use. In assessing the likelihood
that importation plans in neighboring states will be implemented, these
conflicting forces must be balanced. Before making that judgment, however, the extent of water deficit in neighboring states should be quantified
as fully as possible.
In the Appendix, the potential quantitative magnitude of future water
deficits in neighboring states is examined in detail. Results from this
examination establish the basis for conclusions discussed in the concluding segment of this section, regarding the potential pressures in neighboring states to seek the importation of water from New Mexico, and the
implications of these pressures for New Mexico's review of its water
laws.
B. Summary and Conclusions
A summary of water deficits expected in the years 1990 and 2020, as
developed in the Appendix, is given in Table 1 for Texas, Arizona,
Colorado, and Northwestern Oklahoma. The magnitude of these deficits
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COLORADO
OKLAHOMA

NEW
590
ARIZONA

2.5
million

MEXICO

7
339,00millon

TEXAS
1.4

FIGURE 1. Projected Water Deficits in the Year 2020 in States Bordering New
Mexico

is quite large. By 1990 expected deficits in Texas alone are more than
four times larger than New Mexico's total depletions from the Rio Grande
(345,000 a.f./year). The 1990 water deficits in those parts of Texas,
Arizona, Colorado, and Oklahoma in close proximity to New Mexico
(2.4 million a.f./year) are 50-63% of total water withdrawals in the entire
state of New Mexico.
The magnitude of these deficits makes inescapable the conclusion that
economies in these areas face very serious adjustment problems over the
next four decades. It is hard to imagine that planners in these states would
not look for every possible means for mitigating these problems. Water
importation may be the only alternative available for obtaining anything
close to the large quantities of water required for meeting these deficits.
In light of data given in Table 1, the setting for policy commitments of
Texas and Arizona to pursue the water importation option is easily understood. The projected water deficits are being translated into pressures for
state planners to search for water. The proximity of these "searches" to
New Mexico is illustrated in Figure 1. Within this context, increased
attention by neighboring states to water resources in New Mexico is to
be expected.
Obviously New Mexico's sister states will not, or, for a variety of
reasons, could not look to water importation from New Mexico as a
means for resolving all of their water problems. Yet at least Texas and
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Arizona are committed in policy to examine importation options, and
both the economic and legal obstacles to importations from New Mexico
may not prove to be adequate barriers. The degree of risk is demonstrably
large in the case of unappropriated groundwater. Given the protection
afforded by compacts for most interstate streams, the risk is less for those
waters, though not negligible.
Recalling the earlier discussion about conflicting forces acting upon
the economic feasibility of importation projects, an additional fact deserves emphasis. Namely, all of the four surrounding states discussed
above have economies substantially more developed than that of New
Mexico. As measured in 1979 dollars, the per capita incomes of New
Mexico and the four states whose water plans were reviewed are in order:
Colorado ($8945); Texas ($8649); Arizona ($8305); Oklahoma ($8226);
and New Mexico ($7294). As a consequence, there is much greater ability
to pay for water supplies in those states compared to New Mexico. Thus
even with a shift to increased state or local financing of water development
projects, there is a substantial ability within those state economies to pay
for such projects should their citizenry politically choose to do so. That
they might so choose should be assigned a high probability in the case
of municipal demand. For agriculture, however, it is more problematic
with a heavy reliance having to be placed upon the "priceless nature of
water" argument before assigning a high probability to importation strategies for agricultural water.
At a minimum, water shortages of the magnitude shown above will
clearly affect the competitive "climate" between states vis-d-vis water.
Prudence dictates that New Mexicans recognize the character of this
changing climate related to water shortages in neighboring states and their
possible implications for the State of New Mexico. What now is a concern
largely confined to certain border regions may conceivably expand to
other areas of the state as water becomes steadily more valuable in neighboring states.
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Introduction
Conflict is inevitable in our federal system in which the federal government exercises certain powers to the exclusion of state authority. One
of the most common conflicts is between the federal goal of encouraging
free interstate markets for the sale of goods between companies in different
states and the state goal of protecting local economies. In early cases
dealing with state discrimination against out-of-state buyers and sellers,
the Supreme Court concluded that the federal interest in preserving a free
flow of interstate commerce made such discrimination by the states un-
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constitutional. This anti-discrimination principle was extended to prohibit
state discrimination against out-of-state natural gas purchasers. In an early
case2" in the east, however, Justice Holmes concluded that waters of a
stream were unique and certainly different from marketable commodities.
Accordingly, most legal scholars have considered a state's regulation of
its water resources to be outside the so-called "commerce clause" antidiscrimination cases. With respect to surface water, this assumption has
certainly proven true. Congress has unilaterally approved the division of
surface water between states, as it did in the Boulder Canyon Project
Act,2 ' and Congress has approved compacts between states that expressly
discriminate against out-of-state users who want to take surface water out
of state. 2" Groundwater, however, has rarely been before Congress as the
subject of an express act or as part of an interstate compact, except where
groundwater is stream-related. Furthermore, many western states, like
New Mexico, have allowed the creation of rudimentary water markets
as a result of intrastate sale and transfer of groundwater rights.
In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 3 the United States Supreme Court was faced
with the question whether the commerce clause anti-discrimination cases
should be applied to strike down a Nebraska statute which, in effect,
prohibited out-of-state transfers of Nebraska groundwater. The Supreme
Court struck down the Nebraska statute on the narrow ground that its
reciprocity provision violated commerce clause principles. In striking
down the statute, the Court extended these commerce clause principles
to groundwater transfers, treating water like a "good" sold in interstate
commerce. The Court showed its concern, however, that water in the
arid West is different in that arid states need to conserve water for the
future. The court indicated that federal legislation authorizing states to
maintain groundwater stocks within their borders would be an acceptable
solution. Likewise, interstate compacts were cited as examples of appropriate means for resolution of this problem. Finally, the Court concluded
that in arid states water conservation is a legitimate purpose that could
justify a state's prohibition of the exportation of groundwater. After Sporhase was decided, Judge Howard Bratton struck down New Mexico's
statute prohibiting exportation of groundwater. That case has just recently
been returned to Judge Bratton from the Court of Appeals.
The Sporhase case conveys the following message loud and clear: if
a state wishes to maintain its groundwater resources, it must acquire and
assert a proprietary interest in those resources. The committee has isolated
20. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
21. 43 U.S.C. 617-618p (1976).
22. See e.g., Art X of the Yellowstone River Compact, which prohibits diversion of water out
of the basin without the consent of all three signatory states (Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota).
23. U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
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three constitutionally acceptable methods whereby this interest can be
achieved. The first method (Recommendation #1) is to have Congress
act to authorize maintenance of water within a state's boundaries. The
second method (Recommendation #2) is to negotiate a compact with a
sister state and have it approved by Congress. The third method is state
appropriation. If the state appropriates the water within its boundaries
and has a proprietary interest in that resource, it may maintain it in any
location it chooses. This method is recommended for further study (Recommendation #3). Its adoption would be a fundamental change in New
Mexico water law and needs a more thorough examination.
Section B below is a summary of proposed federal legislation that, had
it been passed, would have allowed the individual states to permit, restrict,
or regulate the out-of-state use of their water resources. This is a more
detailed discussion of the committee's first recommendation and proposes
that New Mexico should actively pursue a federal solution to the problem
of state control over export of its water.
Section C discusses the committe's recommendation (Recommendation
#4) that New Mexico impose a five-year moratorium on pending and
future application for unappropriated groundwater statewide, in the Rio
Grande generally, or more specifically aquifers hydrologically related to
the lower Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Reservoir. The moratorium
would allow the necessary time to: a) obtain more complete hydrologic
information on these aquifers (a United States Geological Survey study
is currently underway); b) clarify the existing compact provisions relating
to surface water in the basin (the aquifers are directly related to the surface
water); and c) remove much of the legal uncertainty currently clouding
the use of water from these aquifers.
Section D discusses the subject recommended for further study; namely,
allowing the state, possibly through an agency such as the Interstate
Stream Commission, to acquire rights to unappropriated groundwater and
to allocate the water on a lease basis. Because this option would be a
departure from the state's historical role in water resources allocation,
the committee believes further study is necessary before the state should
consider implementing any plan for state appropriation of unappropriated
groundwater.
Section E discusses miscellaneous concerns that involve one or more
facets of the export of state water. Included in this part are a discussion
of the importance of the special treatment accorded municipalities when
they appropriate groundwater and the application of New Mexico tax
statutes to water exporters.
B. FederalLegislation
As part of its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce,
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Congress has the power to allow the states the authority to control,
regulate, prohibit, or allow the export of state water. In Intake Water
Company v. Yellowstone River Compact Commission, D. Mont. Dkt. state
1184, Oct. 25, 1983, a three-judge panel held that an interstate compact
ratified by Congress operated as a Congressional delegation of power to
allow the prohibition of interstate transportation of surface water. Therefore, a federal statute giving states the power to allocate their own water
resources would enable New Mexico to restrict out-of-state use of water
if it chose to do so.
In the last session of the 98th Congress, three pieces of proposed federal
legislation could have solved New Mexico's water export problem. The
suggestion was made that the proposed Coal Distribution and Utilization
Act of 1983 be amended to allow states to restrict the export of water
except when federal legislation, interstate compact, or United States Supreme Court decree provided otherwise. The Coal Distribution and Utilization Act of 1983 itself would have allowed state bans on water export
when the use involved coal slurry pipelines. The Act, had it passed with
the Amendment, would have been a congressional declaration that export
of water from New Mexico was illegal except by state permit for coal
slurry pipelines.
The second piece of federal legislation, H.R. 1749, simply provided
that states could ban export of water unless a compact provided otherwise.
H.R. 1749 would have provided the most direct solution to New Mexico's
water export problem. The statute, had it passed, would have overruled
the Supreme Court's decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska.
A third piece of legislation, H.R. 1207, would have required that all
interstate transfers occur pursuant to state water laws. This bill appeared
to be a direct response to Judge Bratton's decision striking down New
Mexico's anti-export provision.
The state should seek federal legislation that will permit states to limit
or restrict the export of its water to conserve water for the future. Federal
legislation would provide the simplest and most. direct solution to the
water export problem and would eliminate costly and prolonged litigation.
C. Moratorium on Appropriation of UnappropriatedGroundwater
1) Details of the Option
New Mexico could enact a statute that declares a non-discriminatory
moratorium on all future appropriations of unappropriated groundwater
except for emergency uses. The moratorium, in accordance with the
desires of the legislature, could apply to the entire state, to the Rio Grande
and its tributaries, or to the area of the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte
Dam. Emergency uses would include only those uses that represent an
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immediate need for health and safety that could not be satisfied through
lease or purchase of existing water rights. The moratorium would last for
a relatively short period, such as five years.
Montana has used the moratorium approach as a method of controlling
development of state water resources in specific areas of the state.2 4
Montana's moratorium statutes are basin specific and give the state's
Department of Water Resources the authority to suspend action on applications and to refuse to accept applications. A non-discriminatory moratorium, as proposed, would protect existing water rights from future
impairment and preserve unappropriated water for other uses on a basis
fair to all future appropriators.
In addition to a bill imposing a moratorium, the legislature should also
enact a statute authorizing the Interstate Stream Commission, or some
other state agency that would report to the Interstate Stream Commission,
to study the state appropriation option. Such a study would consider the
pros and cons of implementing a system that would allocate unappropriated groundwater on a lease basis (see Section D below). The Ute
Reservoir is an example of state ownership of surface water rights. The
Ute Reservoir, which is located on the Canadian River, is a water supply
project operated through the Interstate Stream Commission.
2) Rationale
Uncertainty exists concerning what legal restraints apply to out-of-state
use of New Mexico's water. For example, the final outcome of pending
litigation involving the City of El Paso is difficult to predict. The Committee is recommending that the state should enter compact negotiations
with Texas (Recommendation #2). This is because the El Pasov. Reynolds
decision creates uncertainty concerning the division of Rio Grande surface
water below Elephant Butte Dam. A surface water compact with Texas
would clarify the status of related unappropriated groundwater since surface rights have to be purchased and retired as the groundwater is pumped.
A moratorium would not interfere with compact negotiations.
Finally, as New Mexico and the region enter a period of projected
water shortages, long-range planning becomes essential to ensure the
orderly development of the region. Currently, uncertainties exist concerning the future urban, agricultural, industrial, mineral, and energy
development of the region. Large appropriations for future use of the
state's few remaining stocks of unappropriated groundwater would preclude New Mexico and surrounding states from engaging in any meaningful planning of the region's economic, social, and environmental future.
24. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-321-323 (1981). This statute, in effect, imposed a
moratorium on appropriation in the Milk River Basin in Montana.
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The current hydrologic information about the lower Rio Grande needs
further development. A moratorium would give the state the time needed
to determine the amount of water available, the impact on the river, and
the most appropriate method for allocating the state's dwindling and
uncertain supply of unappropriated groundwater among appropriators, the
treaty commitment to Mexico, and compact obligations.
3) Legal Implications
a) Application of the Moratorium to Specific Basins. If it so decides,
the New Mexico legislature can legitimately designate the tributary
groundwater below Elephant Butte Dam as the only area subject to the
moratorium of future groundwater appropriation. The need for a moratorium is most acutely felt in the area below Elephant Butte Dam because
of the tremendous hydrological and legal uncertainties involved.
For example, the hydrology of the area is not fully understood. The
United States Geological Survey is currently conducting a study of the
hydrology of the area. The study is a joint effort that involves New
Mexico, Las Cruces, and El Paso. Results from the study will not be
available for another four to five years. For the State Engineer to take
any action on pending permit applications would be imprudent because
of the hydrologic uncertainties involved.
Another justification for limiting the geographical area below Elephant
Butte Dam is the sheer volume of pending applications. The amount of
groundwater sought to be appropriated in pending applications far exceeds
estimated reserves. The number of pending applications has created an
emergency situation justifying strong measures.
Even though a moratorium below Elephant Butte would delay proceedings on El Paso's application, such delay would be nondiscriminatory
because it would have the same effect on New Mexicans. No other means
of imposing a moratorium would have a lesser impact on El Paso. To
exclude El Paso from the moratorium would result in discrimination
against New Mexicans and defeat the beneficial purposes of the moratorium.
In addition, the time limitation prohibiting appropriation of unappropriated groundwater is only temporary. Therefore, the moratorium would
not violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because
it is neither discriminatory nor burdensome on out-of-state users. A moratorium is a permissible nondiscriminatory exercise of the state's power
and represents a legitimate legislative effort to conserve water resources
and promote their efficient use.
b) The Effect on PendingApplications. Under the terms of the statute,
applications pending, but not acted on, before the effective date of the
moratorium would retain their status as pending applications until after
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the period of the moratorium expired. The postponement of action on
pending applications is not an unlawful taking of property without just
compensation because the applications are not property rights and because
the moratorium by its terms does not affect the final disposition of the
applications.
D. State Ownership andAllocation of UnappropriatedGroundwaterA Concept Deserving Future Study
1) One PossibleApproach
If New Mexico does not receive congressional authorization to retain
its unappropriated groundwater or does not enter into a compact to do
so, or prevail through litigation, New Mexico could enact a statute that
would authorize the state, the Interstate Stream Commission, or some
other state governmental entity to appropriate all or part of the state's
unappropriated groundwater. Under the statute, the designated governmental entity could develop plans for the use and distribution of these
groundwater stocks. The statute would authorize leasing of state-owned
groundwater. The details of leasing would depend on the state's water
policies, which would likely reflect a desire to balance the need to conserve a limited and scarce resource against the need to encourage the
economic development of the state.
None of the perfected surface rights and none of the existing appropriated groundwater rights would be affected. Such a system would also
not have to apply to all of New Mexico's unappropriated groundwater.
Instead, the responsible state entity could have the discretion to appropriate and lease unappropriated groundwater in those areas of the state
requiring additional regulatory control. Such areas might include only
regions containing large urban areas that have future water demands or
rural areas anticipating large industrial uses. The leasing system might
also serve to encourage the development of irrigated agriculture or industrial development in areas of the state where it does not currently exist
if this were the goal of the state legislature.
The responsible state agency might well decide to invest the necessary
resources in the targeted areas to drill wells and construct a suitable water
distribution system. Presumably, the responsible state agency would have
bonding authority so that it could finance the development and construction of the water system.
2) Justificationfor State Ownership
As owner of all or part of New Mexico's unappropriated groundwater,
the state agency could promote the efficient use of existing groundwater
stocks in accordance with the state's planning needs. New Mexico would
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not have to allocate this groundwater solely on a competitive leasing
basis. Instead, the state might determine, as a matter of public policy,
that certain types of water use deserve additional support. In addition, a
leasing system would give the state additional flexibility in allocating
scarce water supplies.
3) Legal Implications
Generally speaking, New Mexico as owner of the groundwater would
have the power to lease the water to whomever it chooses. Under certain
circumstances, New Mexico might not desire to lease groundwater for
out-of-state use, especially if out-of-state use would conflict with the
policies underlying the development of the water distribution system. In
other circumstances it may elect to lease water out-of-state. The ability
of New Mexico to restrict or control out-of-state use of water allocated
by a water leasing system administered by the state ultimately depends
on non-application of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.

The commerce clause allocates federal power to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. If a state statute conflicts with a federal statute that
concerns interstate commerce, then the federal statute will control. Where
no conflict exists, the federal power to regulate commerce still limits
action by a state. This limitation, known as the "dormant" commerce
clause, requires a state statute regulating interstate commerce to be nondiscriminatory in its treatment of residents and nonresidents, to further a
legitimate state interest, and to not unduly burden interstate commerce.2
When, however, a state acts not as a market regullator but as a market
participant, then the dormant clause limitation does not apply. The dormant commerce clause does not apply because the state, acting as a buyer
or seller in the marketplace, does not actually regulate commerce. Instead,
a state that buys or sells in the market has the same freedom as a private
businessman in deciding the who, what, and when of buying and selling.
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has held that a state
that purchases goods can discriminate in favor of the state's residents.2 6
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., the Court upheld a Maryland statute

that facially discriminated against nonresidents. In an attempt to reduce
the number of abandoned cars in the state, Maryland had enacted a statute
that paid a bounty to state-licensed processors of abandoned cars. Processors whose plants were located outside of Maryland were required by
the statute to provide more extensive documentation, which in effect
limited the benefits of the bounty program to in-state processors. The
25. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
26. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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Supreme Court held that the dormant commerce clause in no way restricted a state's ability to purchase items from whomever it wanted.
When a state acts as a seller of goods, it is also immune from dormant
commerce clause scrutiny.27 In Reeves, the United States Supreme Court
upheld South Dakota's preference statute that authorized a state-owned
cement plant to sell only to state residents. In upholding the South Dakota
statute, the court found that South Dakota fit within the "state as market
participant" classification by acting as a private citizen in the manufacture
and sale of a product.
In its most recent decision involving a state or local government acting
as a market participant,2" the Supreme Court held that the mayor of Boston
could constitutionally require that all city-funded construction projects be
performed by a work force of at least half city residents. As a purchaser
of construction services, the City of Boston was a market participant and
therefore was not subject to dormant commerce clause scrutiny.
To the extent New Mexico acquires and asserts a real ownership interest
in unappropriated groundwater, it is a market participant and not a market
regulator. The state ownership must be real and not a fiction. The state
must make a substantial financial investment in the water development
and distribution system. Such an investment is necessary to demonstrate
that state ownership is more than a "legal fiction" designed to regulate
the allocation of water. Once the state invests funds from its treasury for
the development of water resources, preference to in-state residents is
legitimate because the state's residents, having invested tax dollars in a
resource distribution system, can legitimately expect the benefits to flow
first to them.2 9
E. Miscellaneous Concerns
In conducting this study, the committee encountered many statutory
and conceptual problems relevant to the issue of conservation of unappropriated groundwater. Not all of them are listed in the report. This
section summarizes two of these additional considerations.
1) Out-of-State Municipalities
In a number of cases, the courts have held that state statutes exempting
in-state governmental entities from state taxing provisions do not exempt
out-of-state governmental entities from taxation.3" Only where the state
statute or a controlling federal statute expressly indicates otherwise will
27.
28.
29.
30.
Louis,

Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983).
White v. Massachusetts, U.S. -,
See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 441.
City Council of Augusta, Georgia v. Timmerman, 233 F. 216 (4th Cir. 1916); Murray v. St.
291 II1. 600, 126 N.E. 529 (1920); Taggart v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 P. 251 (19-11).

July 1984]

WATER LAW STUDY COMMITTEE

exemption from taxing provisions apply to governmental entities of other
states. 3' In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
governmental entity of another state that undertakes activities or owns
property in another state has the status of a private individual. 32
2) Taxation of Out-of-State Use of New Mexico Water
If New Mexico water is used out-of-state, such use is subject to at
least two New Mexico taxes. The first tax is New Mexico's compensating
use tax which applies to the sale of property outside the state to the extent
the New Mexico gross receipts tax would have applied had the sale taken
place in New Mexico. The sale of a municipality's water, for example,
is subject to the New Mexico gross receipts tax. Therefore, the sale of
New Mexico water outside the state by an out-of-state municipality is
subject to the compensating use tax of from 3.5% to 4.5%, depending
on the county in which the water is extracted.
Likewise, New Mexico's ad valorem tax would apply to any water
rights held in New Mexico where the water is exported for out-of-state
use. Water rights are a type of real property, the value of which is subject
to the ad valorem property tax. Normally, the ad valorem tax is imposed
on land or other real property. If the real property includes water rights,
as in the use of a farm or ranch, the tax base of the farm or ranch will
include the value attributable to any water rights.
If the out-of-state water user is a county, city, or other non-New Mexico
governmental entity, the use and ownership of water rights located in
New Mexico will subject such governmental entity to state taxation.
Again, the United States Supreme Court has held that a governmental
entity of another state that undertakes activities or owns property in
another state has the status of a private individual or entity.33 Therefore,
New Mexico's taxing power extends to an out-of-state governmental
entity owning property or engaging in activity in the state.34
31. See City Council of Augusta, Georgia v. Timmerman, 233 F. 216, 219 (4th Cir. 1916). In
Timmerman, the Fourth Circuit found that South Carolina could levy a tax on South Carolina property
owned by the City of Augusta, Georgia. The court held that the South Carolina statute exempting
cities from taxation did not apply to out-of-state municipalities. To hold otherwise would be to
promote development of cities outside of their borders. Therefore, the court found that "nothing but
the clearest affirmative expression" by the state would warrant such an intrusion on the taxing power
of South Carolina.
32. Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924).
33. Id.
34. City Council of Augusta, Georgia v. Timmerman, 233 F. 216 (4th Cir. 1916); Murray v. St.
600, 126 N.E. 529 (1920); Taggart v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 P. 251 (1911).
Louis, 291 I11.
See Mettet v. City of Yankton, 25 N.W.2d 460, 464 (S.D. 1946), and Florida State Hospital v.
Durham Iron Co., 194 Ga. 350, 21 S.E.2d 216 (1942).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Overview
With regard to federal legislation and interstate compacts, there is little
to be said from an economic perspective. In either case the result would
essentially be a return to the status quo preceding the Sporhase case.
From the New Mexico perspective, the principal consequence would be
to exclude prospective out-of-state water users, such as El Paso, from
access to New Mexico groundwater. The lack of access, in turn, would
remove these users from the marketplace for associated surface rights.
Depending on the extent of latent out-of-state demand for New Mexico
groundwater, the price of a surface water right in the marketplace would
presumably be less than would be the case if out-of-state use of groundwater was allowed and associated purchases of surface rights occurred.
The asset value of surface water rights to existing New Mexico rightholders would be lower, though there is insufficient data to determine
whether this effect would be minimal or significant.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the other recommendations, two
observations warrant mention. First, a number of possible economic effects which might result from any one of the suggested changes are not
subject to quantification. One of these effects, referred to throughout this
section as a "distributional effect," results when a value, or cost, is shifted
from one entity to another. Thus, for example, when ownership of water
passes from a private individual to a state agency, there is no net economic
effect from a social, or state-wide, point of view, presuming that no other
change occurs except the title transfer. If the water right continues to be
applied to the same beneficial use, annual values associated with the right
are unaffected. However, the capitalized value of these annual, beneficial
uses is affected from an individual's point of view-the state agency now
"owns" this value rather than the individual. Thus, the distribution of
wealth among individuals and the state will change, even though there
is no immediate effect in terms of total state-wide incomes.
The spending patterns of individuals differ, and the expenditures of
governments differ markedly from individuals. Therefore, the income
that is derived from ownership of the right by the state may be spent
differently than it would be spent if the unappropriated groundwater went
into private ownership. Although these distributional effects can be noted
when they are relevant in assessing a possible change, the ultimate effects
of these transfers in wealth are not estimated in this report.
Second, in many cases the economic effects which may result from a
possible change would occur only in the future. The future date when
the effect would occur and the potential magnitude of the effect are
certainly relevant information, but information that would be highly spec-
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ulative. If the timing and magnitude of economic effects are speculative,
they are simply mentioned, along with comments as to their potential
orders of magnitudes.
B. A Moratorium on New Groundwater Use Permits
The economic impacts in the state which would accompany a moratorium on new groundwater permits in the Mesilla Bolson (the area of
primary interest for this recommendation) are, because of the legal confusion in the region, not easy to define. 35 If the legal issues can be set
aside, however, the economics of the matter are straightforward. Without
a moratorium, groundwater in the Mesilla Bolson might be put to various
uses which would generate economic values-incomes. With a moratorium, these values would obviously not be generated-the state must
forego these values as a "cost" attributable to the moratorium. Such
costs-foregone values-are referred to as "opportunity costs."
To determine the opportunity costs of a moratorium, answers to four
sets of questions are required: 1) who (what types of users) would receive
permits in the absence of a moratorium; 2) when, after receipt of a permit,
would the water be put to use by each permit holder; 3) what is the value
that would be generated by the holder's use of the water; and 4) what is
the duration of the moratorium? Obviously, there are many possible responses to each of these four questions with highly variable consequences
in terms of the costs incurred. In an effort to provide the reader with, at
a minimum, some notion of the order of magnitude of the opportunity
costs which might accompany the moratorium option, the following discussion presents three possible scenarios for groundwater development
in the Mesilla Bolson that might occur in the absence of a moratorium.
Cost estimates are then developed for each scenario.
The first scenario is based on the possibility that either 1) the courts
would act to uphold El Paso's challenge to the New Mexico statutes and
that the state would grant all of El Paso's applications or 2) that the courts
take no definitive action leaving the legal issues so clouded as to foreclose
New Mexico investments in new groundwater appropriations. If, because
of some judicial resolution in favor of El Paso, the state immediately
granted all of El Paso's applications (a possibility that is unlikely given
the number of protests and hearings and appeals that would take place)
it is unlikely that there would be substantial economic activity in New
Mexico arising from water use because of the size of El Paso's appropriation and the hydrological uncertainty in the region-with estimates
that range from 15,000 acre feet of unappropriated groundwater in stor35. El Paso economic impacts on New Mexico's economy are not being considered because it
proposes a 30-40 year delay before it would begin its use of groundwater in the Mesilla Bolson.
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age (assuming artesian storage coefficients) to 15,000,000 acre feet. Conversely, if the legal status of the unappropriated groundwater is not clarified,
it is also unlikely that there would be substantial economic development
activity that would rely on unappropriated groundwater. Thus, either
under the assumption that all of the El Paso applications were granted or
the more likely scenario, that legal confusion would continue to reign
for at least another three years to five years, the cost of the moratorium
to New Mexico in terms of opportunities foregone during a five year
period would be near zero. Assuming, however, the El Paso applications
were denied or that El Paso's were granted and all New Mexico applications could also be granted, the questions of who might receive permits
in the absence of a moratorium and when such permits might be put to
use become relevant. In what follows, speculation concerning any future
applicants that might apply for groundwater permits in the Mesilla Bolson
is avoided.
Scenario two assumes that applications for irrigation water use in the
amount of 12,000 acre feet/year would be awarded in the absence of a
moratorium; and that municipal and industrial applications would be granted
in the amount of 34,500 acre feet/year. The 12,000 figure includes all
applications other than the large Straus application which, because of its
magnitude, is judged infeasible for immediate use. The 34,500 figure
includes (roundly) all M&I applications, other than El Paso's. Scenario
two also assumes that municipal and industrial uses would also be delayed
20 years and irrigation uses would be delayed 5 years-the normal delay
allowed for non-municipal and industrial uses under present law. Scenario
two differs from scenario three, described below, only in assumptions as
to when such permits are exercised-i.e., the delay between the time at
which permits are received and the time at which they are exercised.
Thus, for scenario three it is also assumed that, in the absence of a
moratorium, permits for 34,500 acre feet/year would be awarded for
municipal and industrial uses and 12,000 acre feet/year would be awarded
for irrigation uses. For this scenario, only a ten year delay for municipal
and industrial uses is assumed, and irrigators are assumed to exercise
their permit immediately; i.e., for irrigators there is no delay between
the time that a permit is received and the exercise (use) of the permit.
These three scenarios may be viewed as essentially bounding the range
of opportunity costs which might accompany a moratorium on new permits in the Mesilla Bolson.
The next relevant question for estimating opportunity costs concerns
the value foregone from each acre foot which is not put to use as a result
of the moratorium. As demonstrated by Bonem,36 returns to water in
36. Unpublished memo by G. Bonem, John Muir Institute, 743 Wilson St., Napa CA (1982).
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irrigated agriculture may range from $54-$108/acre foot for field crops,
to as high as $140/acre foot for higher valued vegetable crops (1980
dollars). For the purposes of this report, the opportunity cost/acre foot
of water use in irrigation is taken to be the average of returns earned in
non-vegetable crops, or $75/acre foot (1980 dollars). In terms of municipal and industrial water uses, a great deal of data exists in terms of costs
paid by municipalities for water systems; unfortunately, little data exists
which would suggest the value of water in these uses. Wollman suggests
37
that this value may range from $760 to $1000/acre foot (1980 dollars).
Brown, et. al., estimate the 1985 market value of water rights in the Rio
Grande Basin, which would reflect some mixture of agricultural and
municipal and industrial uses, at $1,638 (1980 dollars), implying an
annual value of $164.38 Also, annual benefits attributable to Albuquerque's
use of municipal and industrial water from the San Juan Chama Project
are given as $45/acre foot (1980 dollars) 3 9-these benefits are cost-based,
as opposed to value estimates, however. Finally, the municipality of Santa
Fe has actually purchased water rights at prices of $8,400 (1980 dollars,
purchased in the year 1969)40 and $16,702 (1980 dollars, purchased in
the year 1975),"' implying (at 10% nominal discount rates) annual values
varying between $840 and $1,670/acre foot.
In the absence of more precise information as to the value of water in
municipal and industrial uses, this value is probably most closely approximated by municipal purchases of water under conditions of limited
supplies, as in the case of Santa Fe's water purchases noted above. This
would suggest a range of values between $840-$1,670/acre foot, a somewhat higher range than that suggested by Wollman ($760-$1,000/acre
foot). Thus, somewhat arbitrarily, a value which is consistent with both
Wollman's estimate and the Santa Fe experiences-the simple average
of the mid-points of these two ranges-or $1,068/acre foot will be used.
In what follows, then, calculations for opportunity costs are based on
values of water in irrigation and municipal and industrial uses of $75/
acre foot and $1,068/acre foot (1980 dollars), respectively. 42
37. N. WOLLMAN, THE VALUE OF WATER IN ALTERNATIVE USES (1963). The value of
a water right is given a range in 1980 dollars from $7,600 to $10,000. Annual values assume a 10%
nominal discount rate.
38. Assume a 10% nominal discount rate.
39. 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., H. Doc. No. 424 at 15 (for 57,300 a.f.) (June 20, 1960). Inflated by
2.78, to adjust for 1980 dollars.
40. Brown, Water Reallocation, Market Proficiency, and Conflicting Social Values, in WATER
AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION, AND
MARKETS (G. Weatherford ed. 1982).
41. Khoshakhlagh, Forecasting Future Market Values of Water Rights in New Mexico,
(N.M.W.R.R.I., Las Cruces, N.M., July 1977).
42. Market rates for high-grade municipal bonds, from U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRCT OF THE U.S. 1982-85 Table 855 (1983).
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The final question relevant for estimates of opportunity costs concerns
the length of the moratorium. This committee recommends 5 years. Since
however, there is no way of knowing the length of a moratorium the
legislature might choose should they adopt this option, opportunity costs
for scenarios two and three are calculated for moratoriums which extend
over 5 and 10 years.
The impact of immediate granting of El Paso's application under conditions of hydrologic uncertainty or continued legal confusion for 5 to
10 years cannot be calculated and no attempt to reflect this in the table
is included. If scenario one or scenario two (with a five year moratorium)
were considered reasonable, then the present value of the opportunity
costs attributable to a moratorium would be essentially zero. The opportunity cost of a 10 year moratorium under scenario two, however, would
be $3 million. If scenario three were considered reasonable, the opportunity cost would be $4 million for 5 years and $7 million for 10 years.
C. State Ownership and Allocation of Groundwater
As set forth supra as a topic deserving further study, the State of New
Mexico, or one of the governmental units created by it, may choose to
more actively assert the public proprietary interest in unappropriated
groundwater within the state by actually appropriating it.
This section presents an initial review of economic aspects of a state
appropriation. The review will cover three components:
a) the cost of the appropriation itself including any compensation that
must be paid by the state or its agent to any existing applicants and the
possible loss of prospective income by these same applicants that would
have been derived from use of the water which has been appropriated by
the state;
b) the public investment necessary to develop the resource and confirm
title to the appropriated water; and
c) the economic benefits derived from the use of the water once publicly appropriated.
1) The Costs of Appropriation
If the state chooses to appropriate all of the remaining unappropriated
groundwater in a basin, it would not have to pay compensation to persons
who have done nothing more than file application, because they do not
have a vested water right. However, any state permit acquired could not
affect vested water rights or permits; and any state permit would be obliged
to recognize and honor these preexisting rights.
Applicants displaced by the state who seriously intended to make use
of the water would not be able to realize the economic gains that would
have resulted from their use of water, unless some opportunity is provided
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to obtain the water from the state agent holding title under the public
appropriation. It should be noted further that not only existing applications
would be affected but also potential applications that might arise in the
future to the extent that unappropriated groundwater remains after existing
applicants were satisfied. If water is not made available from the state,
distributional effects will certainly occur as the benefits from use of the
water will flow to the public as rightholder rather than to individuals.
These distributional effects could be reduced, or possibly even eliminated, if opportunity to obtain use of the water were provided through a
public lease program or other procedure for allocating the water to which
the public holds actual title. This point is discussed further below.
2) Public Investment
The state must invest substantial resources in the development of the
groundwater resources and associated allocation systems in order for its
proprietary interest to be secure. Discussion of the allocation systems is
deferred until the third economic component (Section 3) is considered
below. With regard to the investment of public funds to actually develop
the water and secure the right, two elements of cost can be identified.
The first element involves the need to acquire sufficient control over
surface rights in New Mexico to be able to offset the effect of groundwater
pumping on the surface flow. Supra was discussed the hydrologic interconnection between a stream-related aquifer and the stream itself. Administratively, conjunctive management of the two systems requires that
the groundwater permit be made conditional upon the ability to retire
surface rights. Otherwise, impairment of surface rights will result. In
order for the state to extract unappropriated groundwater without affecting
the surface rights to the river's flow, it must acquire an option that enables
it to retire surface rights at such time in the future as the river begins to
be affected by the groundwater pumping.
The Rio Grande is a case in point. Regulation of future groundwater
pumping affecting the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Dam is critical
since there is considerable dispute over the data and degree to which the
hydrologic effects of pumping in the Mesilla and Hueco Bolsons would
reach the river. For other stream-related aquifers containing unappropriated water, such as the Middle Rio Grande, there are hydrologic models
whichihave already been adopted administratively, and the projected
effects on streanflow are used in projecting the need for retirement of
surface rights. With the timing and extent of streamflow effect either in
dispute or highly variable from one situation to the next, it would be
unnecessarily speculative in this report to project a date for retirement of
surface rights in any particular aquifer or exactly what that option would
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cost. The expense, however, is clearly an element of any state appropriation option and must be so recognized.
A different investment cost element is the expenditure to develop a
wellfield and make the groundwater available for use. As stated above,
the state must engage in some degree of groundwater development itself
in order to secure its right. However, it is assumed that the state would
not enter the water business itself in the sense of actually using the water
for agricultural, industrial, or municipal purposes. Instead, its role would
be limited to water production through developing the wellfield, water
collection in the sense of tying the wells together into one system, and
minimal transmission to bring it to a point at which a lessee could assume
responsibility. For purposes of illustration, costs are estimated for a wellfield in the Mesilla Bolson.
Based on the assumption that each well that the state might develop
in the Mesilla Bolson is an average, city-class well which pumps, at 80%
of capacity, 3,226 acre feet/year, if lessees accept delivery of water at
the well site for amounts varying between 50,000-150,000 a.f./year,
annual costs would be between $812,000 and $2.4 million per year, or
around $16.23 per acre foot. If the state provides transmission facilitiesfor water leases totaling, e.g., 100,000 a.f./year-annual costs could
range between $1.7 million and $5.5 million/year ($16.54-$55.00 per
acre foot) for pumping and transmission between 2 and 10 miles respectively.
3) Water Allocation and Associated Economic Benefits
If the state were not to make use of the water itself, as is assumed
above, then a procedure must be established for allocating the water once
appropriated by the state. The procedure considered here is a leasing
program in which quantities of water over a stated time period are leased
to public and private parties interested in making use of the water. Two
issues are particularly important here: 1) pricing policy and 2) the term
of the leases.
With regard to pricing, two strategies are discussed below, which serve
to suggest upper and lower limits for prices that the state might receive
for water leases. First, as something of a lower bound, the price for a
water lease might be set at a level sufficient to allow the state to recover
all costs for groundwater development, as well as any operation and
maintenance costs. Cost-based pricing of water has ample precedent. A
similar method is used by the New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission
for the lease of surface waters under its control; and cost-recovery serves
as the basis for establishing water tariffs for projects constructed by the
Bureau of Reclamation.
A second pricing strategy relies on market forces to set prices paid for
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water leases. In essence market forces set the price paid for privately
held water rights in New Mexico now and even private leases are bargained for in the marketplace. The only difference in this case is that the
state is the holder of the water right and is leasing quantities of water
over specified periods of time. There is precedent for such a policy in
the leasing of state owned lands and, at the federal level, in the auctioning
of mineral leases. A variety of auction techniques are possible.
There are substantial differences between these two pricing procedures,
in at least two respects. First, the market based pricing procedure comes
closest to guaranteeing that the water is allocated to its highest valued
economic uses because these uses are generally able to bid more for it.
A pure cost-recovery pricing procedure, in contrast, would make less
distinction among the differing capacities of water users to pay with the
likely consequence that the water is not allocated in the economically
most efficient manner. As a result, an irrigator of high valued crops would
likely be on an equal footing with a municipality under the cost recovery
procedure while being at a likely disadvantage in a market pricing system
because of the ability of municipalities to bid higher. The irrigator of low
valued crops might not be able to compete under either system if the
development costs of the water, combined with operating and maintenance
costs, exceeded the irrigator's ablity to pay.
A second difference between the two pricing strategies arises from the
fact that the market value of the water may substantially exceed its combined development, operating, and maintenance costs. If the state allocated the water on a cost recovery basis, then this "surplus" would accrue
to the leaseholders through the implicit subsidization associated with
leasing the water at less than its market value. In contrast, if the state
employed a market pricing system, this surplus would accrue to the state.
Thus, there are distributional effects that would result from the pricing
procedure chosen.
The second issue which warrants consideration in any discussion of
the state ownership option is the tenure of a water lease; i.e., over what
period of time may a lessee exercise the right to use the state's appropriated groundwater? On one hand, relatively short lease-periods may be
desirable from the state's point of view. Short lease-periods allow for
greater flexibility in state water planning: water use can be easily shifted
from low to higher valued uses as economic conditions change through
time.
On the other hand, efficient uses of water may require substantial capital
investment; for example, efficient water use in the irrigation sector may
require lined distribution canals, and the use of costly sprinkler systems.
Obviously, water users will not undertake such investments if the lease
period is too short to allow for the full depreciation of invested capital.
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Efficient use of water licensed by the state, then, requires "longer" lease
periods. A lease period sufficiently long to permit desirable investments
in water-related capital goods will vary from use to use. The state's
determination of an "optimal" lease period may, therefore, involve some
inquiry as to efficient patterns of water use and investment in various
water using industries.
The Committee takes no position as to the optimal method of pricing,
lease period, or method for water allocation. Rather, it merely recommends further study of these and the numerous other issues that would
arise under state appropriation (Recommendation #3).
APPENDIX
A REVIEW OF WATER DEFICITS IN NEIGHBORING STATES
Estimates for water needs and water availabilities are reported for
Texas, Arizona, Colorado, and Oklahoma. Excluded from this analysis
are the states of Utah and California for several reasons. First, water
deficits at levels expected in Arizona and Texas (to be shown below) are
not anticipated in Utah if the Central Utah Project is completed. If,
however, this project is not completed, deficits could occur in that state
which might be relevant for New Mexico's concerns. Secondly, California
is excluded due to lack of reasonable proximity to New Mexico and the
provisions of the Colorado River Compact, the Supreme Court case of
Arizona v. California and other federal statutes.
Estimates for water needs and availabilities for the four states of concern
here are taken directly from each state's most recent state water plan.
Estimates for water needs, of course, are based on current water use
patterns and anticipated growth in municipal/industrial, power and irrigation sectors in each state's economy. Obviously, when "needs" exceed
available suplies, a water deficit is thereby defined. To make up for the
"deficit" (to supply the state's "needs") new (or enhanced) water supplies
must be obtained via such methods as conservation, desalinization of
saline waters, new reclamation projects, weather modification, or water
imports. Potential concern for New Mexico is created if: 1) water deficits
are large in these states, an issue to be explored in this Appendix, and
2) few in-state options for large water augmentation programs may exist.
This would leave water importation as the only viable alternative to supply
water to in-state users.
a. Texas. Expected water deficits in parts of five Texas water basins
are of particular relevance for this study. These basins are the Canadian
River Basin, the Red River Basin, the Brazos River Basin, the Colorado
River Basin, and the Rio Grande Basin.
The Canadian River Basin consists of parts of 14 counties in north
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TABLE A-1
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN TEXAS:
CANADIAN RIVER BASIN
Water Surplus or (Deficit)

Decade/Water Source

Water
Supply

Water
Demand

Municipal &
Industrial

Irrigation

Total*

1990
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

1753.9
121.0
1874.9

1753.9
134.8
1888.7

0.0
1.6
1.6

0.0
(15.4)
15.4)

0.0
(13.8)
(13.8)

2000
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

3144.5
121.3
3265.8

3144.5
226.9
3371.4

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
(105.6)
105.6)

0.0
(105.6)
(105.6)

2020
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

2972.5
121.6
3094.1

2972.5
630.7
3603.2

0.0
2.1
2.1

0.0
(511.2)
(511.2)

0.0
(509.1)
(509.1)

2030
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

2489.7
122.1
2611.8

2489.7
1316.7
3806.4

0.0
3.9
3.9

0.0
(1198.5)
(1198.5)

0.0
(1194.6)
(1194.6)

1809.1
133.2
1942.3

1809.1
2120.7
3929.8

0.0
11.3
11.3

0.0
(1998.8)
(1998.8)

0.0
(1987.5)
(1987.5)

*Reflects surplus in municipal and industrial sector.
Source: Texas Department of Water Resources, 1983, p. 111-1-15, 17, Tables 111-1-5 and 111-1-6,
includes zones I and 2. All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.

Texas. Municipalities in the Basin include Amarillo, Spearman, and Perryman. Table A-I presents water supplies, demands, and expected water
deficits in the Canadian Basin for the 1990s through the 2030s. With
groundwater from the Ogallala aquifer supplying the bulk of water needs
for municipalities and irrigation in this Basin, the effects of anticipated
depletions of these groundwater stocks between the year 2000 and 2030
is seen in the dwindling groundwater "supplies" shown in Column 2 of
Table A-i; during this period, groundwater supplies are expected to fall
by 42%, from 3.1 million a.f./year to 1.8 million a.f./year. Water deficits
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TABLE A-2
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN TEXAS:
RED RIVER BASIN
Water Surplus or (Deficit)
Decade/Water Source

Water
Supply

Water
Demand

Municipal &
Industrial

Irrigation

Total*

1990
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

1017.7
38.4
1056.1

1017.7
146.4
1164.1

0.0
11.7
11.7

0.0
(119.7)
(119.7)

0.0
(108.0)
(108.0)

2000
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

1572.5
37.8
1610.3

1572.5
660.5
2233.0

0.0
6.0
6.0

0.0
(628.6)
(628.6)

0.0
(622.6)
(622.6)

2020
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

1470.4
37.4
1507.8

1470.4
2098.4
3568.8

0.0
4.4
4.4

0.0
(2065.4)
(2065.4)

0.0
(2061.0)
(2061.0)

2030
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

951.6
36.9
988.5

951.6
2530.8
3482.4

0.0
3.2
3.2

0.0
(2497.1)
(2497.1)

0.0
(2493.9)
(2493.9)

768.7
36.5
805.2

768.7
3023.4
3792.1

0.0
2.0
2.0

0.0
(2988.9)
(2988.9)

0.0
(2986.9)
(2986.9)

*Reflects surplus in municipal and industrial sector.
Source: Texas Department of Water Resources, 1983, p. 111-2-9, Table 111-2-5 includes zone 1 only.
All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.

are expected in the irrigation water using sector, with the deficit rising
from 13,800 a.f./year during the 1990s to about 2 million a.f./year during
the 2030s.
The Red River Basin lies directly below the Canadian River Basin.
Only the western zone of the Red River Basin will be considered here,
in which the major municipalities are (parts of) Amarillo, Hereford, and
Friona. Recall, from discussion in the text, the 1967 application by Friona,
Texas for water supplies in New Mexico. Expected water deficits in this
area for the 1990s through the 2030s are given in Table A-2. These deficits,
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TABLE A-3
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN TEXAS:
BRAZOS BASIN
Water Surplus or (Deficit)
Decade/Water Source

Water
Supply

Water
Demand

Municipal &
Industrial

Irrigation

Total*

1990
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

2621.6
107.4
2729.0

2621.6
891.5
3513.1

0.0
42.1
42.1

0.0
(862.2)
(862.2)

0.0
(784.1)
(784.1)

2000
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

2433.2
107.2
2540.4

2433.2
1409.2
3842.4

0.0
23.4
23.4

0.0
(1325.4)
(1325.4)

0.0
(1302.0)
(1302.0)

2020
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

2401.0
107.1
2508.1

2401.0
2124.5
4525.5

0.0
6.5
6.5

0.0
(2023.9)
(2023.9)

0.0
(2017.4)
(2017.4)

2030
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

1873.9
107.1
1981.0

1873.9
2615.5
4489.4

0.0
0.9
0.9

0.0
(2509.3)
(2509.3)

0.0
(2508.4)
(2508.4)

1433.0
107.1
1540.1

1433.0
3486.9
4919.9

0.0
2.7
2.7

0.0
(3382.5)
(3382.5)

0.0
(3379.8)
(3379.8)

*Reflects surplus in municipal and industrial sector.
Source: Texas Department of Water Resources, 1983, P. 111-12-25, Table 111-12-25. All numbers are
in thousands of acre-feet per year. Zone I only.

increasing from 108,000 a.f./year in the 1990s to almost 3 million a.f./
year in the 2030s, result, in large part, from exhausted groundwater
supplies and are seemingly limited to the irrigation sector.
The Brazos River Basin (again, only the western zone adjacent to New
Mexico is considered here) lies to the east of Clovis, New Mexico and
includes the municipalities of Lubbock and Bovina. Recall that Bovina,
Texas inquired as to the use of New Mexico's water resources in 1983.
Large water deficits in the irrigation sector are expected in 1990 (Table
A-3)--some 784,000 a.f./year-and are expected to rise some 430% by
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TABLE A-4
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN TEXAS:
COLORADO RIVER BASIN
Water Surplus or (Deficit)
Decade/Water Source

Water
Supply

Water
Demand

Municipal &
Industrial

Irrigation

1990
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

1193.9
66.6
1260.5

1193.9
861.3
2055.2

0.0
0.7
0.7

0.0
(795.5)
(795.5)

0.0
(794.8)
(794.8)

2000
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

1102.5
85.0
1187.5

1102.5
1390.6
2493.1

0.0
0.3
0.3

0.0
(1305.9)
(1305.9)

0.0
(1305.6)
(1305.6)

2020
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

836.6
96.9
933.5

836.6
1686.1
2522.7

0.0
0.2
0.2

0.0
(1589.4)
(1589.4)

0.0
(1589.2)
(1589.2)

2030
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

722.5
120.9
834.4

722.5
2108.2
2830.7

0.0
1.2
1.2

0.0
(1988.5)
(1988.5)

0.0
(1987.3)
(1987.3)

584.9
137.9
722.8

584.9
2324.1
2909.0

0.0
0.1
0.1

Total*

0.0
(2186.2)
(2186.2)

*Reflects surplus in municipal and industrial sectors.
Source: Texas Department of Water Resources, 1983, P. 111-14-23, Table 111-14-6. Includes Zone 1
only. All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.

the decade of the 2030s, to 3.4 million a.f./year. Note, from Table A-3,
the decline in expected groundwater supplies from 2.6 million a.f./year
in the 1990s to 1.4 million a.f./year in the 2030s. The Brazos River Basin
overlies the Edwards-Trinity (High Plains) aquifer.
The Colorado River Basin in Texas is adjacent to the southeast corner
of New Mexico; water deficits in the western zone of the Colorado River
Basin are of interest here. Municipalities in the area include Midland,
Odessa, Garden City, and Plains. The pattern of water deficits expected
in the Colorado River Basin (Table A-4) parallel those discussed above.
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TABLE A-5
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN TEXAS:
RIO GRANDE BASIN
Water Surplus or (Deficit)
Decade/Water Source

Water
Supply

Water
Demand

Municipal &
Industrial

Irrigation

Total

1990
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

604.5
1737.9
2342.4

604.5
2091.1
2695.6

0.0
-

0.0
(104.4)
(104.4)

0.0
(353.2)
(353.2)

2000
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

734.1
1746.8
2480.9

734.1
2851.6
3585.7

0.0
-

0.0
(726.6)
(726.6)

0.0
(1104.8)
(1104.8)

2020
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

776.1
1755.8
2531.9

776.1
2960.1
3736.2

0.0
(7.5)
(7.5)

0.0
(730.2)
(730.2)

0.0
(1204.3)
(1204.3)

2030
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

780.3
1766.2
2546.5

780.3
3149.0
3929.3

0.0
(71.3)
(71.3)

0.0
(734.0)
(734.0)

0.0
(1382.8)
(1382.8)

422.6
1776.0
2198.6

422.6
3868.5
4291.1

0.0
(303.2)
(303.2)

0.0
(992.1)
(992.1)

0.0
(2092.5)
(2092.5)

'Includes Zones I & III only.
2
Includes Zones I, II, & III.
Source: Texas Department of Water Resources, 1983, P. 111-23-22, 24, 26, Tables 111-23-4, 5 and
6); zones 1, 2 and 3. All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.

Groundwater supplies are expected to decline markedly-from 1.2 million
a.f./year in the 1990s to .6 million a.f./year in the 2030s. Total water
deficits are expected to rise some 275% over that period-from .8 million
a.f./year in 1990 to 2.2 million a.f./year in the 2030s.
Finally, three water planning zones in Texas' Rio Grande Basin are of
interest for this work. This is the part of Texas that lies to the south and
southeast of New Mexico, which includes the municipalities of El Paso,
Anthony, Fort Bliss, Fort Stockton, and Del Rio. Rapidly increasing water
deficits are expected in this Basin (Table A-5), not only in the irrigation
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TABLE A-6
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN ARIZONA:
PLANNING DISTRICT II (PIMA COUNTY)
Decade

Water
Supply

1970
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

72
0
72

1990
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total
2020
Groundwater
Surface Water
Total

Water
Demand

Water
Deficit

267
339

49
179
228
42
183
225

63-1521
291-380'

44-339'
279-564'

'Based on Low and High Alternative Scenarios.
Source: Arizona Water Commission, 1977. All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.

sector but in the municipal sector. Water deficits of 56,200 a.f./year are
expected in Zone I's municipal sector (includes El Paso) by 2020, rising
to 250,400 a.f./year by the year 2030. Total water deficits are expected
to rise from 353,200 a.f./year in 1990 to 2.1 million a.f./year by the
2030s.
b. Arizona. Of Arizona's six Planning Districts those in the eastern
half of the state are given attention for the purposes of this work. The
municipalities of Tucson (District 2) and Safford (District 6) are, therefore,
included in our analysis of water deficits in Arizona.
Beginning with Planning District 2, water supplies in the District are
almost exclusively from groundwater sources. Pima County includes the
City of Tucson and is also the state's leading producer of copper. Irrigated
agriculture dominates the southern part of the county. Falling water tables
are reflected by diminished groundwater use in this area between 1970
and 2020 (Table A-6)--groundwater use is expected to decline from
72,000 a.f./year in 1970 to 49,000 a.f./year in 1990 and 42,000 .a.f./
year in 2020. Surface water from the CAP is expected by late 1985,
thereby reducing current deficits (267,000 a.f./year) to between 63,000152,000 a.f./year by 1990-ranges for expected water deficits reflect
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TABLE A-7
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN ARIZONA:
PLANNING DISTRICT VI (COCHISE, GRAHAM, GREENLEE, AND
SANTA CRUZ COUNTIES)
Decade

Water
Supply

Water
Demand

Water
Deficit

1970
Cochise
Graham
Greenlee
Santa Cruz

85
132
33
5

353
159
33
13

268
27
0
8

255

558

303

97
147
43
5

212-499
152-228
43-57
11-16

115-402
5-81
0-14
6-11

292

418-800

126-508

97
145
41
8

97-616
145-269
74-120
8-20

0-519
0-124
33-79
0-12

291

3241026

33-734

1990
Cochise
Graham
Greenlee
Santa Cruz

2020
Cochise
Graham
Greenlee
Santa Cruz

Source: Arizona Water Commission, 1983. All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.

differences in assumptions as to growth in water needs over time. Even
with CAP water, however, deficits in this region could be as high as
339,000 a.f./year by the year 2020 unless the new groundwater legislation
proves effective.
Expected deficits in District 6, adjacent to New Mexico's southern
border, are given in Table A-7. To adequately meet water needs in 1970,
short-falls of water on the order of 303,000 a.f./year were identified.
Depending on the nature of growth in water demands in this four-county
area, water deficits of 126,000 to 508,000 a.f./year are anticipated by
1990, 33,000 to 734,000 a.f./year by the year 2020.
In Planning District 5, which is comprised of Gila and Pinal counties,
current water deficits on the order of 600,000 a.f./year (Table A-8) will
be reduced by CAP water by 1985. Thus, by 1990, the District could
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TABLE A-8
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN ARIZONA:
PLANNING DISTRICT V (GILA AND PINAL COUNTIES)
Decade

Water
Supply

Water
Demand

Water
Deficit

1970
Gila
Pinal

19
254

19
874

0
620

273

893

620

34
991

33-39
935-1035

1-5
54-44

1025

968-1074

57-49

37
645

64-89
645-1192

682

709-1281

27-52
0547

1990
Gila
Pinal

2020
Gila
Pinal

27599
Source: Arizona Water Commission, 1977. All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.

have a water surplus of 57,000 or, given rapid growth in the area, a small
deficit of 49,000 a.f./year. By 2020, however, notwithstanding the District's receipt of CAP water, deficits on the order of 27,000 to 599,000
a.f./year are anticipated.
Arizona's Planning District 3 is adjacent to New Mexico's northwest
border. Water deficits are seemingly not expected for this district.
One should note that the water deficits reported above were calculated
prior to Arizona's adoption of its Groundwater Management Act of 1980.41
This Act provides for the establishment of Groundwater Management
Areas (GMA) in areas where groundwater supplies are being depleted.
The management goal for Tucson, Phoenix, and Prescott GMAs is the
reduction of groundwater pumping to "safe yield" levels (the elimination
of mining) by the year 2025.' All GMAs are required to prepare a
sequence of groundwater management plans. For the first management
period (1980-1990), management plans must provide for:4 5
43. Laws 1980, 4th S.S., Ch. 1, 45-401 et seq.
44. Id. at 545-62.
45. Lands in irrigation prior to 1980; no new irrigation is allowed once an area is designated as
an "active" GMA.
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(i) permissible water use ("water duties") for irrigating historical
crops on "grandfathered" ' lands based on the assumption of reasonable conservation methods. "Reasonable" conservation methods
include such things as the use of lined ditches, land leveling and
efficient water applications but excludes required changes from flood
irrigation to drip or sprinkler irrigation.
(ii) reduced per capita water consumption in municipalities via the
introduction of conservation measures. Industries are required to
adopt latest commercially available conservation technology.
Management plans for the second (1990-2000), third (2000-2010),
fourth (2010-2020), and fifth (2020-2025) management periods must
provide for increasingly stringent conservation practices.4 7 Irrigators must
adopt "maximum" conservation practices (including, presumedly, changes
to drip and sprinkler irrigation methods) and municipalities must consistently lower per capita water consumption levels. Means for achieving
conservation goals are not set out in the Act, nor is mention made of the
amount of "reduced" per capita consumption which will satisfy the Act's
requirements. Moreover, the implications of any potential failure to actually achieve conservation goals are not clear. Thus, Arizona's new
Groundwater Management Act may have the effect of reducing the deficits
noted above, but the magnitude of such reductions will, obviously, depend
upon the manner in which provisions of the Act are implemented.
c. Colorado. The Colorado State Water Plan is somewhat dated (1974)
and is focused primarily on identifying issues; e.g., "Should there be a
state policy on future population growth?" 48 Water problems are described
in qualitative terms, but expected water deficits are not estimated. For
example, city/towns with water quality or quantity "problems" in 1970
are identified as shown in Table A-9. In terms of irrigation, limited and
declining water supplies for irrigation are mentioned in the state water
plan, 49 but quantitative estimates for short-falls are not given. Interestingly, the study notes potential adverse effects on the agricultural economy
of the state as municipalities acquire water rights held by farmers. There
is an implicit rejection of economic criteria for guiding water acquisition
decisions. The study concludes: "A definite need exists to determine,
adopt and implement a water use policy that will direct Colorado's future
development on the basis of criteria other than ability to pay (emphasis
added). "5 0
Estimated deficits for municipal water supplies in two Colorado mu46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Laws 1980, supra note 1,at 45-563.
Id. at 45-565-45-568.
State of Colorado, et al.(February 1974).
Id.
Id.
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TABLE A-9
COLORADO-CITIES AND TOWNS WITH SHORT TERM WATER
SUPPLY PROBLEMS1
City or Town
Problem

1970
Population

Population
Trend

Aspen
Austin
Basalt
Boulder
Brighton
Carbondale
Craig
Cortez
Delta
Denver SMSA**
Durango
Fort Collins
Fort Lupton
Fort Morgan
Glenwood Springs
Greeley
Gunnison
La Junta
Lamar
Las Animas
Meeker
Montrose
Rocky Ford
Trinidad
Walsenburg

2,439
1,163
419
66,870
8,309
726
4,205
6,032
3,694
1,227,529
10,333
43,337
2,489
7,594
4,106
38,902
4,613
7,938
7,797
3,148
1,597
6,496
4,859
9,901
4,329

rapid growth*
rapid growth*
rapid growth
rapid growth
rapid growth
rapid growth
slow growth
rapid growth
slow growth
rapid growth*
rapid growth
rapid growth
slow growth
slow growth
rapid growth
rapid growth
rapid growth
slow decline
slow growth
slow decline
rapid growth
rapid growth
slow decline
slow decline
slow decline

Type of
quality
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity
quantity

and quality
and quality

and quality
and quality

and quality
and quality
and quality
and quality
and quality

'Some problems are related to inadequate facilities.
*Growth is occurring outside the city limits.
**Includes Boulder County.
Source: State of Colorado, et al., February, 1974, Table 6.3 at p. 6.9.

nicipal areas in the Southwest-Durango and La Plata, Colorado-have
been prepared by the Bureau of Reclamation and are given in Table A10. The projected water deficit in these two urban areas in close proximity
to New Mexico's northwestern counties is 800 a.f./year in 1980, and is
expected to increase more than ten-fold by 2020, to 9,000 a.f./year.
However, relief may occur here as a result of the Animas-La Plata project,
if it is constructed.
Thus, in the case of Colorado, we know that growth is expected in
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TABLE A-10
PROJECTED WATER DEFICITS IN TWO SOUTHWESTERN COLORADO
MUNICIPALITIES 1980-2020

Year

Water
Demand

Water
Supply

Water
Deficit

1980
1990
2000
2010
2020

6,100
7,900
10,100
12,200
14,600

5,300
5,600
5,600
5,600
5,600

800
2,300
4,500
6,600
9,000

Source: Bureau of Reclamation, "Animas-La Plata Project-Definite Plan Report," U.S. Department
of the Interior, Washington, D.C., September, 1979, p. 20.

TABLE A- Il
ESTIMATED WATER DEFICITS IN OKLAHOMA'S NORTHWEST
PLANNING DISTRICT
Augmented
Year
Supply
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040

Water
Demand

Water
Supply
(current)

Water
Supply
(augmented)

Water
Deficit
(current)

Supply

885
1118
1250
1428
1613
1785
1954

805
865
865
865
865
865
865

1,006
1,006
1,006
1,006
1,006
1,006
1,006

80
253
385
563
748
920
1089

112
244
422
607
779
948

'State of Oklahoma, April 1, 1980, p. 154. All numbers in thousands of acre-feet per year.
2
1bid., p. 155.

southern municipalities; declining groundwater tables and municipal growth
(and attendant growth in demands for water) are expected, all else equal,
to result in reduced levels of agricultural activity in this area. Thus, water
planners in Colorado may face increasing pressure to find ways to ameliorate their water deficit problems. Means for accomplishing these ends
are not stated in the Colorado Water Plan. Therefore, in contrast to Texas
and Arizona, there is no stated policy in Colorado relating to future
interests in water importation projects. However, Colorado's participation
in the Ogallala study might be considered evidence of an interest in
importation, as a major component considered in that study is a large
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scale importation plan. Of course, to the extent local opposition will
permit, and capital is available, Colorado still has unused portions of its
Colorado River allotment on the western slope of the Rockies which in
concept could meet eastside demand. However, the intrastate conflict
over additional transfers of this type would be considerable.
Finally, it deserves restatement that the interest of Colorado Fuel &
Iron, Inc. for Vermejo water has already been revealed through the original
action Coloradov. New Mexico." Although undertaken under the mantle
of "equitable apportionment," the suit nevertheless reveals a willingness
on the part of Colorado officials to seek water already fully appropriated
in New Mexico.
d. Oklahoma. Adjacent to New Mexico's northeastern boundary, Oklahoma's Northwest Planning region includes an area with a major dependence on groundwater (from the Ogallala aquifer) supplies. Rights to
surface water in the Northwest Planning region (55,164 a.f./year) are but
a small fraction of groundwater rights used in this region (1.6 million
a.f./year)"2 Pumping from groundwater in this region increased dramatically between 1960 and 1974: the number of wells used in this region
increased from 400 in 1960 to 2,067 in 1974." 3 As one might expect,
rapid water withdrawals have resulted in falling water tables. In some
parts of this region,5 4 water tables fell by as much as 102 feet during the
1960-1974 period.
Population in the Northwest Planning Region is projected to increase
by 33% between 1977 and 2040. 55 With associated growth in urban water
demand, along with demands for water in the irrigation sector, substantial
water deficits are anticipated as shown in Table A-11. With currently
developed water supplies, small deficits exist at the present time. These
deficits are expected to increase sharply over the next few years, rising
to 253,000 a.f./year by 1990 and 948,000 a.f./year by 2040.
Apart from the large, south-to-north water transfer system mentioned
in the text, above, a plan for augmenting water supplies in the Northwest
by 114,000 a.f./year is under consideration by the state. The plan would
involve the construction of several reservoirs in the north at an annualized
cost of $19.8 million (1978 dollars). Thus, the augmented water supply
would be provided at an annual cost of about $140.00 per a.f. The effects
of such a plan are shown in Table A-11. Water deficits are reduced to
112,000 a.f./year in 1990 and 948,000 a.f./year in 2040.
To meet the deficits anticipated by the year 2040, the State of Oklahoma
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

State of Colorado v. State of New Mexico, No. 80 Original, October Term (1977).
State of Oklahoma (April 1980).
Id.
Id.
Id.

July 1984]
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is considering the Northern Water Conveyance System (NWCS). This
system would transfer about 1 million a.f./year to the north, thereby
meeting the area's expected water deficits. As noted in the text, the benefitcost ratio for this project is but .16--expected annual benefits are 16%
of annual costs. Annualized costs for transferring 1,034,000 a.f./year to
this area are $364.8 million, or about $353.00 per acre foot. Given that
the bulk of this water would serve agricultural uses, yielding expected
annual benefits of only $17.00 per acre foot,56 the feasibility of the NWCS
is obviously questionable on economic grounds. Despite this dismal measure of economic feasibility, however, the project remains under consideration.
e. New Mexico. For completeness it should be noted that New Mexico
also faces "deficits" in most basins in the state. Exact comparability
among New Mexico and its neighbors in this regard is not possible since
the 1976 planning study57 did not follow the methodology used in other
states of projecting water "needs" without regard to the availability of
water supplies sufficient to meet those "needs." While repeatedly discussing the possibility of importation as part of a management plan, the
study did not factor in this possibility. Rather, it accepted the known
water supplies as the maximum available supply and assumed that irrigated acreage would be retired through the marketplace in response to
increased depletion in non-agricultural sectors. In effect the authors of
the 1976 study projected the retirement of irrigation rights as the "deficits"
increased, rather than leaving the "deficits" as problems to be met by
possible importation as has occurred in the Texas and Arizona plans.
Even so, it is possible to calculate a minimum estimate of the implicit
deficit projected in the New Mexico study. Before adjusting downward
the amount of irrigated acreage that would exist in the state in 2000 and
2020 after transfers of water rights, the authors first estimated irrigated
agriculture's water depletion without regard to the growth in water depletion by other sectors. The resulting reductions in agricultural depletions
can be thought of as deficits in the same sense as those of the neighboring
states. On a statewide basis, the deficit for 2000 ranged from 66,000 to
199,000 acre-feet per year, depending on the population projection used,
to a range of 330,000 to 722,500 for 2020.58 To put these figures in
perspective, note that the 1976 study estimated the total depletion in the
state for all uses in 1970 (the irrigation component was from 1969) was
56. Assuming that 95% of transferred water is used by irrigation, and annual benefits of $17
million. Id.
57. USDI Bu. Reclamation in cooperation with State of New Mexico, New Mexico Water Resources Assessmentfor PlanningPurposes (Nov. 1976).
58. Id. at Tables 16 and 47.
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2,215,100 acre-feet.5 9 In this context, the prospective New Mexico deficits are also seen to be quite large. Methodologically, moreover, they
still are substantial underestimates when compared to other states because
the projected irrigation depletions were not allowed to exceed available
physical supplies, and no account was taken of increasing recreational
demands.

59. Id. at Table 7.

